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We are besieged with information every day, our inboxes overflow with spam and our 
search queries return a great deal of irrelevant information. In most cases there is no 
malicious intent, just simply too much information. However, if we consider active 
malicious entities, the picture darkens. Denial of information (DoI) attacks assail the 
human through their computer system and manifest themselves as attacks that target the 
human's perceptual, cognitive and motor capabilities. By exploiting these capabilities, 
attackers reduce our ability to acquire and act upon desired information. Even if a 
traditional denial of service attack against a machine is not possible, the human utilizing 
the machine may still succumb to DoI attack.  When successful, DoI attacks actively alter 
our decision making, often without our knowledge.  
In this dissertation, we address the problem of countering DoI attacks.  We begin 
by presenting a taxonomy and framework of DoI attacks and countermeasures to add 
structure to the problem space.  We then closely examine the use of information 
visualization as a countermeasure.  Information visualization is a powerful technique that 
taps into the high bandwidth visual recognition capability of the human and is well suited 
to resist DoI attack.  Unfortunately, most information visualization systems are designed 
without a clear emphasis on protecting the human from malicious activity.    To address 
this issue we present a general framework for information visualization system security 
analysis.  We then delve deeply into countering DoI in the network security domain using 
carefully crafted information visualization techniques to build a DoI attack resistant 
security visualization system.  By creating such a system, we raise the bar on adversaries 
 xiii
who now must cope with visualization enhanced humans in addition to traditional 
automated intrusion detection systems and text-based analysis tools.  We conclude with a 










The Problem of Denial of Information Attacks 
We experience denial of information (DOI) attacks every day.  Our inboxes are swamped with 
spam and the subject lines sometimes fool us.  Our search engine queries return many irrelevant 
results and online auctions are plagued by corrupt database records filled with intentionally 
misleading keywords.  We waste time sifting through useless information and in many cases we 
are actively tricked into taking incorrect actions.  These attacks go far beyond simple denial of 
service (DOS), which attempt to prevent legitimate users access to a service and typically target 
the processing, memory and bandwidth resources of the machines we use.  While denial of 
information attacks include denial of service, they extend to include any attacks that intentionally 
or unintentionally consume human resources, mislead, confuse or trick the user into taking 
inappropriate actions or not taking appropriate actions. Ultimately, denial of information attacks 
target the human.  The result may simply be consumption of time and the slowing down of our 
decision-making or, even worse, force us to make incorrect decisions.  
     Concealing of information (steganography) or attempting to make it unreadable without 
special knowledge (encryption) are legitimate related issues, but are distinct from denial of 
information. The key difference is that denial of information attacks attempt to manipulate or 
overwhelm the human with malicious information thereby limiting their ability to get to the 
information they seek.   
     The problem of denial of information attacks is not new.  History provides a rich set of 




despite a great deal of noise within the information environment.  Examples include the failure of 
the United States to predict the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 and on the World 
Trade Center on September 11, 2001.      
     This quest is exacerbated today by the rapid growth in the rate at which information is 
generated and communicated.  Two recent University of California, Berkeley studies on how 
much information is created clearly illustrate the problem [71,72]: 
• In 2002, about 5 exabytes of new information were created in print, film, magnetic and 
optical formats. In 2000, the estimate was only one to two exabytes per year. Five 
exabytes is equivalent to 37,000 times the size of the United States Library of Congress 
book collection or 800 megabytes per person based on the world population. 
• From 1999 to 2002 information in these formats grew at a rate of 30%  
per year. 
• Ninety-two percent of this information was stored on magnetic media. 
• In 2000, humans annually exchanged some 610 billion emails and browsed 2.1 billion 
static web pages on the World Wide Web.   
• Use of the Internet has grown 2000% from 1992 to 2000.  
 
      In today’s information environment, this growth has outstripped our ability to find and 
process the information that we seek, despite the increased information processing capabilities at 
our command.   This is a non-trivial problem even without being hampered by malicious entities 
seeking to inject noise into our environment.  In this dissertation we assume that in a world 
without malicious entities traditional information retrieval and information overload issues can 




political, economic and social gain.  In this dynamic environment it is difficult to even determine 
who the attackers are. One individual’s absolutely credible source is another’s propaganda, but 
we assume there is only one ground truth.  The combination of intentional and unintentional 
clouding of our information environment prevents us from finding, assimilating and acting upon 
the information we seek.  Representative examples include: 
• The Google SafeSearch feature, while intending to filter sexually explicit content, 
actually filters a great deal more, including tens of thousands of pages without any such 
content [30]. 
• In the late 1990’s a World Wide Web bookseller purchased the word “the” on a pay-per-
click search engine, resulting in thousands of irrelevant responses to search queries. 
• Web server content when filtered at the IP address level can block access to many other 
unintentional sites sharing the same hosting service [31]. 
• A Silicon Valley programmer became so enraged by the content of spam he received that 
he sent threats to torture and kill employees of the offending company.  In an interview 
after his arrest, he  “acknowledged that he had behaved badly, but said his computer had 
been rendered almost unusable for about two months by a barrage of pop-up advertising 
and e-mail.” [125] 
 
      In comparison to traditional denial of service (DOS) attacks, denial of information (DOI) 
attacks target the human by exceeding their perceptual, cognitive and motor capabilities. Even if 
traditional DOS attacks against a machine can be countered, the human utilizing the machine to 
process information may still succumb to a DOI attack.  The ultimate result of a successful attack 




counter these attacks, we must develop mechanisms that will allow us to find the right kind of 
place in the information space, one that will provide the information that we seek.  This can be 
visualized in figure 1.1. 
      In this figure, the large circle represents the total information sphere; information produced 
by all sources and all possible communication channels.  This information universe is constantly 
evolving; new information is constantly being created while other information is continually 
being destroyed.  Whether information is pushed to the human (as in an email list) or pulled (as 
in a web search engine) the human must attempt to select and properly address the information 
they seek (represented by the star).  The smaller circle represents this selection and the lines 
linking the human to this circle represent the communication channel. Due to limitations in 
today’s addressing mechanisms and semantic search technology, frequently this search will 
return unwanted information (noise) concealing the information they seek (signal). 




     Consider the signal-to-noise ratio of your email inbox, messages that you value are the signal 
and others are noise, spam.  Other problems you might encounter include the lack of an answer 
in the information space or an inability to adequately specify the search such that it includes the 
desired information.  To analyze the effect of the signal to noise ratio on the human, it is useful 
to consider the OODA loop model developed by United States Air Force Colonel John Boyd 
[53].  In this model, humans repeatedly go through four steps (Observe, Orient, Decide and Act) 
as they assimilate information and act upon it.  In a competitive environment the individual who 
can execute these steps faster has the advantage. Each step can be slowed by denial of 
information attacks.  For example, an email user may spend time deciding to delete a given email 
with a particularly compelling subject line.  Another class of attack will force the user to perform 
extra cycles through the loop.  For example, an email user must spend time scanning their inbox, 
deciding to delete (or not delete) each message and then physically performing the delete 
operation.  Ultimately, these attacks might exhaust the human’s available resources (e.g. time for 
the task) so that the loop halts as the human moves on to other tasks.  A third class of attack 
includes those that so cloud the information environment that incorrect decisions are made, also 
forcing extra cycles through the loop. 
     There are potentially many ways to help counter denial of information attacks.  In Chapter 3 
we will cover a broad range of these techniques.  In later chapters, we focus on the use of 
information visualization to address denial of information problems associated with network 
security.  The massive amount of security data generated by network sensors and host-based 
applications can quickly overwhelm the operators charged with defending the network.  Often, 
important details are overlooked and it is difficult to gain a coherent picture of network health 




traditional graphing and charting techniques.  In many instances, this flood of data will actually 
reduce the overall level of security by consuming the operator’s available time or misdirecting 
their efforts.  In extreme circumstances, the operators will become desensitized and ignore 
security warnings altogether, effectively negating the value of their security systems.   
 
Using Information Visualization to Counter Denial of Information Attacks in the Network 
Security Domain 
 
In this dissertation we focus specifically on this denial of information problem by carefully 
crafting an information visualization system designed to present security data in insightful ways 
that tap into the high bandwidth visual recognition capability of human operators.  To actively 
counter denial of information attacks against security analysts we constructed and evaluated an 
experimental system to improve data quality and analyst insight.  The visualization techniques 
we used reduce the amount of irrelevant data (noise) and increase the useful information (signal) 




     We began our work by surveying security analysts to determine the limits of today’s best 
systems and identify high payoff targets for improvement.  There were 39 participants, primarily 
professional security analysts working in industry.  Our survey studied the limits of two open 
source security tools in very wide use: Snort, an intrusion detection system, and Ethereal, a 
network analysis tool.  Figure 2 shows that the majority of the survey participants start to 
become overwhelmed when the number of intrusion detection alerts reaches only tens of alerts 
per hour.  Similarly, in packet analysis, overload occurred when faced with only hundreds to 
thousands of packets.  Participants were explicitly asked to describe when they, as humans, 
became overloaded and not to respond based on the resource limitations of their given hardware 
platforms.  It is useful to examine the thresholds by analyst background.  Information security 
students had a lower capability to cope with alerts, reaching overload at an average of 30 alerts 
Figure 1.2: Results from Survey of Expert Security Analysts from Academia and Industry. Figure 
depicts threshold at which human overload occurs when analyzing network packets (dark gray) and 




per hour.  Professional security analysts were able to handle more alerts than students, but most 
still faced overload at approximately 230 alerts per hour.  The situation is similar for packet 
analysis.  Information security students felt that Ethereal became difficult to use when the 
number of packets exceeded 500.   Professional security analysts were able to handle a larger 
number of packets without overload, but most respondents felt that Ethereal became difficult to 
use when faced with datasets of more than 6,000 packets.  Our security visualization system 
directly addresses these issues and our results indicate that analysts using it are able to cope with 
approximately ten times more information without overload and can rapidly detect and locate 
data of interest that would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, using conventional tools. 
 
Dissertation Overview  
Thesis 
Our thesis is that it is possible to counter denial of information attacks in the network security 
domain by augmenting humans with carefully crafted visualization systems. 
 
Thesis Contributions 
In this thesis we make contributions in the following areas in direct support of our  thesis.   
Taxonomy and Framework of Denial of Information Attacks 
The problem of denial of information attacks is ill defined.  Chapter 3 addresses this problem 
from a big picture perspective and contains the following contributions: 
• a taxonomy of denial of information attacks and countermeasures 




Information Visualization Threat Analysis 
Before information visualization systems can be created to counter denial of information attacks, 
a clear understanding of possible threats and countermeasures is required.  Chapter 4 performs 
such an analysis and makes the following contributions.   
• a framework for information visualization system security analysis  
• a taxonomy of malicious attacks  
• technology independent principles for designing information visualization systems that 
will resist attack   
 
Visualization System 
Chapter 5 consists of the results and lessons learned from the design and implementation of a 
security visualization system based upon the counter DOI principles discussed in Chapters 3 and 
4.  The primary contributions fall into the areas of system design, attack fingerprinting and task 
specific visualization design.  
 
Attack Fingerprinting 
In order for security visualization systems to be effective, it is critical that the analyst can 
identify events of interest.  While attacks have evolved that evade traditional automated intrusion 
detection and analysis techniques, a visualization enhanced human will inherently detect 
different signatures and different anomalies. While it is still possible to fool a network analyst or 
system administrator, we argue that properly designed visualizations enhance the capabilities of 
the human in such a way that greatly complicates the efforts of an attacker.    The fingerprinting 




• demonstrates that commonly employed network attack tools leave clear visual 
fingerprints 
• presents a catalog of network attack tool fingerprints 
 
Task Specific Visualization Design 
 
Tightly coupled animated security visualization: Current work in the area of security 
visualization primarily uses stand-alone visualization windows and loosely coupled static 
displays.  Our visualization technique tightly couples three windows to provide a flexible, 
animated display of network traffic to allow insightful monitoring and playback of captured 
network traffic.  The primary contributions described in this section include: 
• the novel use of tightly-coupled, animated, time-sequence scatter plots and parallel 
coordinate plots in both 2D and 3D to rapidly analyze network traffic   
• an exploration of the effective use of labeling, animation, scaling, and fading as well as 
interaction techniques to cope with extremely large ranges of categorical and discrete 
numeric data   
• an in-depth analysis of real-time and forensic network traffic from a large scale university 
honeynet  
• the ability to scan large datasets of network traffic for malicious activity despite the 
visual noise of legitimate activity and facilitates “at a glance” insight directly supporting 





Malicious Binary Object Visualization:  While visualization of network security data has 
recently emerged as a powerful technique to provide insight and support analysis, current best 
practices have operated at a high-level and examined only external information, such as packet 
addressing information and miss payload based malicious activity.  The primary contributions of 
this section cover the following: 
• a novel visualization technique that allows comparison of hundreds of binary objects 
• experimental results from using the technique on malicious and non-malicious network 
traffic datasets 
•  a novel application of the semantic zoom paradigm in the security visualization domain  
System Design 
Visualization techniques do not stand alone.  They require an underlying system architecture and 
interface to be effectively used.  We created such a system by integrating the novel visualization 
techniques discussed above with five other visualization techniques that have rarely been applied 
to the network security domain.  We crafted task-specific variants of these visualization windows 
for a total of 15 different views and integrated them all into a single, easy to use system using a 
PVR metaphor.  The key contributions of this section include: 
• a framework for security visualization systems design 
• lessons learned from the design and implementation of our security visualization system 







Human-centric Evaluation of Security Visualization Systems 
To evaluate the effectiveness of our security visualization system we conducted two controlled 
experiments to test the ability of intermediate and advanced users to both detect and precisely 
locate security anomalies in network traffic.  The primary contributions include: 
• the first quantitative evaluation of a security visualization system 
• results and lessons learned from the design and execution of the experiments 
• a quantitative validation of our system and visualization design 
 
Thesis Outline 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 places our work in the field 
of current research and synthesizes the state of the art in denial of information and the 
visualization of security data.  Chapter 3 presents a taxonomy of denial of information attacks 
and countermeasures in order to add structure to the problem.  Section 4 presents a general 
framework for information visualization system security threat analysis, a taxonomy of 
visualization attacks and technology independent principles for information visualization system 
designers.  Chapter 5 includes the results and lessons learned from the design of our DOI 
resistant security visualization system and a general framework for the design of future systems.  
Chapter 6 describes and analyzes the results from two human-centric evaluations of our system 











The area of denial of information is intensely multi-disciplinary; spanning, at least, computer 
science, communications theory, knowledge management, intelligence analysis, epistemology 
and even library science.  In this dissertation, we examine denial of information initially from the 
big picture perspective and then deeply explore the problem in the network security domain.  
This related work chapter follows the same structure.  We will first place our work amongst the 
larger problem of denial of information and then focus specifically on the use of security 
visualization as a solution.    In the area of security visualization we examine the key aspects:  
attacking visualization systems, system design, visualization design, user needs assessment and 
human-centric evaluation in order to provide the context into which our work is placed. 
Denial of Information 
Denial of Information is a broad problem, but two areas, in particular, illustrate current best 
practices: spam and search engines.  Techniques for countering spam and improving search 
engines deal directly with the core problem of denial of information by attempting to increase 
signal while reducing noise. 
     Spam illustrates denial of information attacks using push technology.  Email is pushed from 
an information producing node to the inbox of the human.  A human’s inbox can quickly become 
flooded with useless and resource consuming unsolicited email.  Spam is fought with 
technology, the legal system and by humans forming counter-spam organizations.  The first-ever 
spam conference was held in 2003 [98].  Also in 2003, the United States Federal Trade 




open source community has banded together to create SpamAssassin [97] which uses email 
header analysis, textual analysis, the Vipul’s Razor spam signature database [117] and blacklists 
such as mail-abuse.org [73] and the Open Relay Database [81] to block spam.  Beyond the more 
traditional keyword and text-based analysis filtering, Bayesian filtering has emerged as today’s 
counter-spam technology of choice [48,49,86,92].  Burton’s SpamProbe program currently 
reports 99.96% effectiveness using multi-word Bayesian filtering, but spammers are adapting 
their techniques in an attempt to overcome Bayesian filters [99].  Due to ongoing one-
upmanship, it is uncertain whether Bayesian filtering will continue to enjoy this level of success 
in the long run. Legal attempts to counter-spam are also being made.  The Federal Government 
of the United States recently passed legislation that prohibits sending commercial email 
messages unless the recipient has requested it [58].  It remains to be seen if legal action will be 
effective in reducing spam.  More aggressive measures are also being suggested.  Graham 
suggests using web-spiders to extend the reach of current filters by scanning links within email.  
Given the high volume of spam sent, this could result in a DOS attack against the spammer.  
Graham also suggests the potential of an ELIZA-like artificial intelligence program to engage 
spammers via email [50].  This is particularly interesting because it turns the tables against the 
attackers and performs a DOI counterattack against the human aggressor. 
     The corruption of search engines illustrates denial of information attacks using pull 
technology.  The user formulates a query and pulls information from a search engine.  If a web 
search engine’s database has been corrupted, and all of them are to some degree, the user will be 
subject to a denial of information attack.  Initially, search engines relied upon HTML meta-
keyword and meta-description information as well as full text searches of pages to construct their 




techniques [102,103]. Currently, many search engines rely on the democratic nature of the web’s 
hyperlink structure to build relevant database indices.  Representative of this type of denial of 
information countermeasure is Google’s PageRank system [45,84].  PageRank calculates 
authoritative sources of information and gives them better placement in the search engine.  
Authoritative sources are identified by a large number of incoming links from external pages.  
The PageRank algorithm increases the weight of these external pages based upon their 
importance.  It is supplemented with Googlebot technology that verifies the freshness and 
accuracy of its search index [46].  Web indices such as Yahoo rely upon human web surfers to 
verify the veracity of initial listing requests and updates [126].  Despite the effectiveness of 
systems such as PageRank there is a continuing effort to subvert them [23]. 
     Other pertinent research includes the study of information design and information quality.  
For example, the information design work by Tonfoni analyzes the allocation and utilization of 
information resources despite incomplete information, limited time and cost concerns.  Of 
particular note is her discussion on what is “highly significant” to the consumer of the 
information and what is “disturbing noise.” [109]  Researchers studying the area of information 
quality have similar concerns.  For example, Wand uses an ontologically based approach to 
define data and improve overall quality. [119] 
     There are a wide variety of techniques from other domains that can potentially be used to 
counter denial of information attacks.  The Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) uses a Certificate 
Authority (CA) to enable confidentiality, integrity and authentication for communications [28].  
PKI, while generally improving trust, suffers from several shortcomings including duplicate 
names in large communities, failure of some components of the infrastructure to check for 




or compromise of personnel.  Previous work by Ahamad presents an overview of the denial of 
information problem, as well as a node-based model for gathering feedback from users, based 
upon positive or negative transactions, to create private and shared trust information [2]. 
     Trusted computing seeks to allow a user to trust their system and, importantly, allows others 
to trust your system as well.  Trusted computing typically relies upon a chain of trust beginning 
with trust of hardware and commercial operating systems software, but there are many open 
questions and a final trusted computing solution lies beyond reach [4,118]. 
     While there has been some work in the area of DoI there has not been a concerted effort to 
coalesce and define the field.  Chapter 3 helps to address this issue, as well as extend our related 
work discussion, through the development of a comprehensive taxonomy of denial of 
information attacks and countermeasures with specific emphasis on technical solutions.   
Attacking Visualization Systems 
Visualization systems are employed to counter denial of information problems in many domains, 
but while each information visualization system and technique has inherent strengths and 
weaknesses (see [123] for an excellent survey) researchers do not examine the potential of a 
malicious entity acting upon the system.  As we explore the construction of a security 
visualization system it is critical to perform a threat analysis in order to understand where it is 
vulnerable to attack. 
     The field of information warfare and the related fields of psychological warfare, propaganda 
and battlefield deception do include the notion of external malicious entities.  In general, these 
fields seek to use deliberately false or misleading information to change people’s understanding 
through deception and confusion rather than persuasion and understanding [29].  While the 




been widely used in the context of information visualization.  We will consider these techniques 
in our work. 
     Information visualization, as an area, involves analysis of data sets in which the data is more 
abstract in nature, having no natural physical or geometrical representation [100].  Examples of 
data domains common to information visualization include statistics, financial data, text, and 
software.  Research into the manipulation of information visualization systems is relatively 
uncommon, however.  The VizLies special session of several IEEE Visualization conferences  
[60] did address malicious visualization, but only in an informal manner, as entertainment at 
evening social functions.  Several researchers have more formally considered the notion of 
malicious visualizations. Tufte addressed such concepts as the “lie factor,” disappearing 
baselines, the difference between height and volume in pictograms, misleading or missing scales, 
missing data, design dominating the data and the effect of 3D graphics on correct interpretation 
[111,113,114].  All are valid, but anecdotal, instances of malicious visualizations. Tufte further 
explores the boredom, wasted-time and degraded quality and credibility of communication by 
incorrectly utilizing PowerPoint presentation software [110,112].  While there are some 
interesting characteristics relevant to malicious visualizations (e.g. degraded quality of 
information and wasted time), these essays deal with the limitations of PowerPoint presentations 
in a non-interactive speaker to audience scenario.  Books such as How to Lie with Charts [63] 
and How to Lie with Statistics [59] also explore techniques to design presentations and reports 
that mislead audiences or readers.  In a similar vein, researchers such as Globus [41] and Bailey 
[7] focus on how system creators can massage their results to mislead audiences. Rogowitz 
considered the application of perceptual rules to preventing “lying with visualization.”  He did 




     From our perspective, the primary limitation of these works is that they focus on techniques 
the creator of the visualization system, business presentation, advertisement or statistical report 
can use to manipulate their audience.  Our work assumes that this is not the case and that the 
creator of the information visualization system is non-malicious.  Our malicious entities attempt 
to attack the system itself, it’s data and the human attempting to utilize it.  They are not the 
owners or creators of the system in question. 
     The uniqueness of our work, presented in Chapter 4, stems from the comprehensive analysis 
of the weaknesses of visualization systems, and their supporting data flow, including: data 
sources, data communications, data storage, processing, presentation and human interpretation. 
A novel taxonomy of attacks is presented as well as a technology independent set of design 
principles to assist in countering such attacks.    We used these design principles to inform the 
design of our system presented in Chapter 5. 
 
Security Visualization 
We use visualization to counter denial of information attacks in the network security domain.  To 
do this, we must be able to develop systems that allow us to detect malicious activity despite the 
noise of DoI.  The following sections describe how our work extends current research in 
fingerprinting such malicious activity and packet level security visualization.  
Fingerprinting 
Related work falls into several main areas including current network security visualization 
research as well as application and operating systems fingerprinting.  While network 
visualization and intrusion detection are relatively mature areas, there is a limited body of work 




stability of Internet routing[104,106], analysis of stepping stone pairs[105], monitoring the 
security status of large networks [93], mapping of the Internet[17,24], application of statistical 
methods for intrusion detection[74], intruder behavior characterization[33], worm 
propagation[22], rapid prototyping[64], TCP/IP sequence number generation[130,131], haptic 
integration [80] and the construction of a toolkit for visual intrusion detection [43].  Availability 
of security-centric commercial and open source/free visualization systems is likewise limited.  
Representative examples include: Secure Decisions’ SecureScope, Lancope’s StealthWatch + 
Therminator, Etherape, Netstumbler, 3DTraceroute and XTraceroute.   SecureScope provides 
high-level overviews of intrusion detection alerts projected onto a map-like matrix.  
StealthWatch + Therminator applies thermodynamic theory to create a bar graph indicative of 
the quality of data at any given time and relies upon the StealthWatch intrusion detection system 
for source data.  Etherape creates a circular graph of network nodes and creates interconnections 
based on network activity.  Netstumbler uses a colored bar graph to show signal strength of 
wireless network signals.  3DTraceroute shows delays between network nodes in a three-
dimensional plot and XTraceroute uses IP geolocation technology to plot traceroute data on a 
globe. 
     We chose a comprehensive approach to visualize network attacks that included consideration 
of all TCP, UDP, IP and Ethernet header fields as well as many features that can be derived from 
this data.  After examining the data available, we considered a broad range of visualization 
techniques from classic information visualization literature and current research in network 
security visualization.  Finally, we examined a variety of network attack tools from the Top 75 
Network Security Tool List [38] produced by Fyodor, the creator of nmap.  This list was 




visualization techniques and security tools we constructed a series of experiments to test the 
hypothesis that these tools could be effectively fingerprinted.  We understand that a proficient 
attacker can evade many of these techniques, primarily due to lack of authentication in today’s 
network protocols, but feel that visual fingerprinting remains one of the most effective 
techniques at present.  Such is the case with much of the information security field, for now and 
into the foreseeable future it will likely continue to be an on going battle of one-upmanship.  
     The primary contributions of this portion of the dissertation include the demonstration of the 
efficacy of fingerprinting common attack tools, the ability to provide rapid insight into the 
attacker’s operating system type and the possible lineage of the code in use, the ability to detect 




Information visualization is a mature field with a wide range of techniques that have been 
successfully applied to many domains.  But only recently has work been done in earnest to apply 
these techniques to network security and other related information assurance problems.  
Examples include Girardin [40] who used self-organizing maps to detect malicious network 
activity and Nyarko [80] who used haptic feedback to find suspicious activity in network traffic.  
Another interesting example is the Spinning Cube of Potential Doom [69], which visualizes real-
time port and IP data in a three-dimensional cube as a rotating scatter plot.   While quite useful to 
see coarse trends in large-scale networks, it lacks animation, multiple visualizations and 
interactive capability.  The visualization technique we outline in this portion of the dissertation 




plots was first proposed by Inselberg [61].  Several researchers have applied the technique in the 
network security domain, including Marchette [74] and the National Center for Advanced Secure 
Systems with their VisFlowConnect tool [93,127].  We extend their work by combining parallel 
coordinate views and animated scatter plots into a single cohesive visualization.   In addition, we 
add three-dimensional functionality that allows the user to zoom and pan the combined 
visualization. We also explore system performance characteristics not seen in other work as well 
as the use of fading.  Fading is used in Etherape, but the tool provides only a single visualization 
of network traffic arranged in a circular graph [34].  Similarly, Erbacher [33] used a circular 
visualization composed of animated glyphs to demonstrate that intruder behavior is surprisingly 
observable.  Both of these approaches, while effective for moderate numbers of network nodes, 
can quickly become crowded.  Our combined visualization approach supports a far greater 
number of nodes.  We estimate this gain to be about an order of magnitude more nodes.  When 
combined with our zooming capability, this gain can reach several orders of magnitude, but at 
the cost of additional human interaction.  During the design of this portion of our system, we 
relied upon the work by Komlodi [66] and Fink [36] as well as our own survey (see Chapter 6) to 
ensure we incorporated real-world operator requirements.  We also examined best of breed open 
source security visualization tools.  Snort [96] and tcpdump [108] provide industry standard 
network monitoring capability, but only as textual output.  Ethereal also offers excellent textual 
output and protocol parsing, but only provides very basic visualization capability [35].  In our 
research, we analyzed several interesting datasets including botnet and honeynet traffic.  To the 
best of our knowledge, there has been no work done on visualizing botnets.  There has been 
some initial work on honeynet visualization.  Honeynet monitoring is typically conducted with 




visualization capability. The Honeynet Security Console is a useful tool to store and analyze 
large amounts of data [1].  Sebek can correlate low-level host-based data (e.g. launched 
programs, keystrokes, accessed files) with network data to evaluate honeynet intrusions [8]. The 
result can be visualized as a dependency graph.  Another useful, but again, primarily text based 
tool is OSSIM.  Its primary strength lies is the correlation of multiple data streams, a feature that 
we do not currently provide [82]. 
Binary object visualization 
Visualization of security data has recently emerged as a powerful technique to provide insight 
and support analysis that is difficult with traditional text and charting techniques as well as 
signature and anomaly based machine processing.   Current best practices in the network 
visualization domain employ scatterplots [42,75,127], parallel coordinate plots and line segments 
[53,107,125], glyphs [32], geographic layout [21,68,78], text representation [65], graphs [51,34] 
and similar high-level techniques to support security analysts.  While current techniques have 
been proven useful through anecdotal evidence and evaluations [10,13,67,29], we believe that 
they should be combined with low-level representations of network packets, including payloads, 
to create domain-specific highly interactive systems.  To this end, we present both a novel low-
level visualization technique that we call a binary rainfall and a visualization system which 
allows users to semantically zoom [11] through eight representations of network traffic.  We also 
explore the use of dynamic queries [122] and interactive encoding to enhance the performance of 
the system.   
     Some of the most promising network security visualization systems to date make excellent 
use of packet header data, particularly at the network and transport layers.  While very useful in 




subsequently miss payload based malicious activity.    To address this issue, our binary rainfall 
technique allows users to compare payloads of 600-1000+ packets at one time.   
   While text has been the most common way to examine packet payloads, some research has 
been completed that uses visualization and other techniques.  Axellson combined a Bayesian 
classifier with visualization to support analysis of HTTP payloads [5].  Signature based intrusion 
detection systems, such as Snort [96], excel at the pattern matching of packet payloads.  Ethereal 
[35] is an exceptionally comprehensive protocol analyzer, which dissects packets and displays 
payloads in textual format.  In the area of intrusion detection, Wang and Stolfo demonstrate a 
statistical approach based on the byte frequency of packet contents and return results in the form 
of byte frequency histograms [120].  In the area of file visualization, Yoo constructed self-
organizing maps based on the executable content [128],  abstracting away the underlying low-
level binary structure.  In the related field of binary analysis, the IDA Pro disassembler [27] and, 
to the best of our knowledge, all other reverse engineering tools, rely solely on the textual 
representation of binary objects.   The common characteristic of these approaches is that they 
display the payload solely in textual format or abstract away the payload altogether and produce 
only higher-level information.  Our graphical approach attempts to break the paradigm of the 
canonical hex and ASCII format used by these approaches, while at the same time, allowing the 
analyst to view low level details of packet headers and payloads. 
     To test the efficacy of the rainfall visualization, semantic zoom, dynamic queries and 
interactive encoding, we implemented a system that performs both live packet capture and 
forensic analysis using libpcap formatted files.  We examined a variety of malicious and non-
malicious network traffic including DEFCON Capture the Flag [94], United States Military 




collected from a Botnet sinkhole created at Georgia Tech.  These datasets included worm traffic, 
buffer overflows, network scans, trojans and other malicious activity.  In addition, we examined 
several classes of typically non-malicious activity including SMTP, HTTP, Telnet, SSH, VoIP, 
FTP and SSL.  From this experience, we present results and lessons learned. 
     To summarize, the primary contributions of this portion of our work are a novel visualization 
technique that allows comparison of hundreds of binary objects, experimental results from using 
the technique on malicious and non-malicious network traffic datasets, an application of the 
semantic zoom paradigm in the security visualization domain and lessons learned from the 
design and implementation of the underlying system. 
 
User Needs Assessment and Human-centric Evaluation of Security Visualization 
The preface to the Visualization for Computer Security (VizSec) 2005 proceedings contains a 
telling statement.  The editors state that approximately 20% of the accepted papers incorporated 
user studies, but that they believed this was an important improvement.  This is indicative of both 
the current state of security visualization research as well as for security systems in general.  
Despite the distinct shortage, there is useful representative work to help inform the design of our 
user study and experiments.  As we reviewed these papers and others in the security evaluation 
literature, a consistent theme emerged.  Quantitative evaluation requires a small number of tasks 
and straightforward metrics in order to accomplish useful results using a limited number of 
qualified and available study participants.  As an example, three of these studies [39,121,9] used 
a small number of participants for key elements of their evaluation: 12, 43 and 6 respectively.  
Our assessment is echoed by research that indicates that only five individuals are required to find 




but this was a unique case involving phishing emails.  Subjects in this instance were not 
informed of their participation in the experiment and were tricked, in large numbers, into 
participating via a misleading email. 
     While there has been some initial research that explores user requirements to guide the design 
of security visualization systems [10,13], formal studies of security analyst requirements are 
limited. Of those studies, there have been several good examples of requirements gathering from 
professional security analysts.  Initial work was completed by Yurcik [129].  In this study, four 
National Center for Supercomputing Applications (NCSA) security staff members and several 
incident response team operators contributed security related operational interface requirements.  
The primary interface requirement being the need for an overall view of an entire network that 
provided situational awareness.  Goodall conducted a series of semi-structured interviews, 
lasting one to two and a half hours, with nine individuals.  Two members of this group were 
information security analysts and two were intrusion detection system developers.  The 
remainder were network administrators.  All participants had some intrusion detection 
experience.  The results of this survey led to the development of a three-phase task model for 
intrusion detection tasks and insight into analyst collaboration [44].  Subsequently, the authors 
have supplemented the interviews with a focus group and prototype usability evaluation for a 
total of 16 participants.  Their extended study led to the creation of an information visualization 
framework for intrusion detection [66].  D’Amico conducted a U.S. Government sponsored For 
Official Use Only (FOUO) cognitive task analysis of 41 information assurance analysts [26].  
Some results from this work are publicly available [25] and have led to insight into how security 
visualization can be used to enhance situational awareness.  Our work differs significantly from 




and packet level analysis tools.  In particular, we examine the specific cognitive overload issues 
analysts face when using these tools as well as analyst’s perception of the tool’s susceptibility to 
the injection of malicious data.  General information on the injection of malicious data to attack 
human operators is available [87], but is primarily theoretical in nature. 
     Human-centric evaluations of security visualization systems are quite sparse in the literature.  
Most are informal reviews conducted by a small number of potential users.  Results are primarily 
anecdotal in nature.  The remainder of existing studies are qualitative.  Recent examples include 
Fink’s evaluation of the Portall process level visualization tool [37] and Komlodi’s evaluation of 
the Intrusion Detection Tool Kit (IDtk) [67].  While qualitative evaluations provide useful 
insights, quantitative evaluation is critical to effectively compare and contrast tools as they seek 
to meet user requirements.  To the best of our knowledge, our work (see Chapter 6) is the first 





A TAXONOMY AND FRAMEWORK FOR COUNTERING DENIAL OF 
INFORMATION ATTACKS 
 
Denial of information is a critical problem, but current research is scattered and application 
specific.  This chapter provides an overarching umbrella to better understand the problem space.  
The definitions, taxonomy and framework provide the clarity and structure required to begin 
holistic research in countering denial of information attacks.  We can then place the use of 
information visualization within the larger scope of denial of information solutions as we move 
forward to the research we present in later chapters. 
Terminology 
 
The following are the primary objects and concepts from the framework we propose: 
 
node – A machine producer and/or consumer of information.  Each node has available finite 
amounts of processing, I/O and storage resources.  In most cases, nodes are interconnected 
through communication channels. 
  
communication channel – The medium used to transmit a message from transmitting node to 
receiving node. A communication channel has a finite ability to transmit information. 
 
information object -- All individually addressable objects within the data universe.  These objects 




(noise).  Malicious entities may design inappropriate information objects so that they appear as 
signal or design sought after information objects such that they appear as noise. 
 
information universe – The set of all possible nodes, information objects and communication 
channels. 
 
human -- A user of a node.  The human interacts with the node using vision and hearing for input 
as well as motor skills and speech for output. Each human has available finite amounts of 
cognitive processing, perceptual capabilities and memory.   
  
Denial of Information (DoI) - reduction of the ability of an information node or human to acquire 
desired information and as a result may be deceived or lack the available resources to complete a 
given task.  When the attack is written to target just the computational resources of the node it is 
considered a traditional denial of service attack. 
 
Denial of Information Taxonomy and Framework 
 
This taxonomy and framework considers both the objects and actions associated with the denial 
of information domain.  It is a result of consultations with domain experts who analyzed the 
design for completeness and applicability.  In addition to domain experts, we observed users in 
denial of information scenarios.  While it is difficult to prove the absolute validity and 
completeness of the taxonomy, we conducted 12 months of analysis at Slashdot.org and other 




allowed us to see patterns in the denial of information domain.  Each new instance allowed us to 
iteratively improve and verify the taxonomy.  To further refine the taxonomy we reviewed the 
proceedings from recent anti-spam conferences and several relevant knowledge management 
conferences and verified that each of the relevant objects and actions were reflected in the 
taxonomy.  So while we cannot verify the absolute completeness of the taxonomy we do believe 
we have paid due diligence to make it comprehensive and accurate. 
 
Overview 
Objects in this framework fall into four main categories: information nodes, their interconnecting 
communication channels, humans and information objects.  Actions include production, 
consumption, attacking and defending.  Each information node can be a producer and/or 
consumer of information.  Humans interact with information nodes to search for and, in some 
cases find, information that they seek.   In this model, humans are also consumers and producers 
of information that they feed into or receive from information nodes.  They work through 
information nodes to accomplish their tasks. 
 
The goal of this framework is to characterize the components and characteristics in which denial 
of information attacks occur.  This model framework recognizes three levels of granularity, but 
only addresses two:  the coarse node level and the medium grain transaction level.  It does not 
attempt to deal with the fine-grained semantic meaning of a given piece of information.  As an 
example of this granularity consider the following: 
• Node level - do you trust a given website. 




• Semantic level - do you trust a given fact on a web page. 
We leave the integration of semantic level techniques for future work. 
 
Categorization of Actions 
Actions take the form of information attacks and defenses initiated by humans as well as the 
production or consumption of information.  Attacks target the producer, consumer and/or the 
communication channel.  Attacks exploit inherent vulnerabilities in the human or machine as 
they processes the data. Perspective is important to consider at this point.  One individual’s 
defense is another person’s attack.  Consider the case of a spammer who initiates a wave of 
emails in an attempt to sell a product.  If some of those people use a technological defense such 
as email filtering or, perhaps, a legal defense such as a cease and desist lawsuit; what the 
recipients consider defenses are perceived as attack from the perspective of the spammer who is 
seeking information on potential customers.   
Production 
Producers are information nodes that provide information to other nodes.  They may do this 
directly, by gathering information from other nodes, humans or sensors.  The information they 
provide is within the spectrum of absolute accuracy to absolute inaccuracy.  Their intent may be 
to provide accurate content, misinformation or a combination of the two.  They may take 
countermeasures in an attempt to bypass the protection measures put in place by consumers.  In 
some cases they may deliberately cloak the misinformation by surrounding it with a great deal of 
accurate information.  This may also include modifying the information to bypass such 




consumer’s filtering mechanisms.  Producer nodes typically have a large number of outbound 
channels to consumers. 
Consumption 
Consumers are information nodes that receive information from producers.  They may receive 
the information directly, as in the case of a web search engine query, or they may have the 
information pushed to them, as in the case of email.  They may or may not have requested the 
information.  Typically the goal of consumers is to acquire a certain amount of accurate 
information while filtering extraneous noise.  In most cases, the more noise that penetrates their 
defensive mechanisms the greater the likelihood of a successful denial of information attack.   
 
Attacks 
Attacks may be intentional or unintentional, but always degrade the quality of information 
received by the human. This is manifest in a lower S/N.  An attack manifests itself typically by a 
human giving instruction to an information node.  Table 3.1 illustrates the following scenarios.  
 
Table 3.1: Denial of Information Attack Scenarios 
 Signal(S) Noise(N) S/N Impact 
Scenario #1 Low Low Parity Marginal to good ability to 
find information. 
Scenario #2 High Low Good Good to excellent ability to 
find information. 
Scenario #3 Low High Bad DoI 
Scenario #4 Very High Very High Parity DoI, processing, I/O or 









     An ideal web search by a consumer using a reputable search engine will return results where 
noise is low and signal is high (Scenario #2).  In the case of a malicious node, the results might 
include pay-per-placement advertisements in response to the query, thereby increasing the noise 
(Scenario #3).  The consumer may incorrectly formulate their query and receive only marginal 
results (Scenario #1) or through no malicious action at the producing node receive incorrect 
information (also Scenario #3).  Attacks succeed by preventing the consumer from receiving the 
information they desire in the time window they need it or by transmitting noise that incorrectly 
appears to be valid information.  This usually occurs when the information processing capability 
of the human is overloaded, but may also occur if the information processing capabilities of their 
automated information processing hardware and network cause the problem (Scenario #4).  Both 
the attacker and the defender may take countermeasures in order to increase the likelihood of 
their success.  The success of attacks is measured by the influence it has on the decision making 
of the target.  In other words, how much change is there in what the target does or does not do.  





Defensive countermeasures may be utilized by both the attacking and defending nodes to 
increase or reduce the likelihood of a successful denial of information attack.  A defender 
uses legal, regulatory, moral, cultural, organizational, financial, technological and 
perhaps even violent countermeasures to reduce noise and/or increase the signal in their 
information environment.  An attacker may use the same measures to increase the 
likelihood of a successful denial of information attack. Table 3.3 lists a taxonomy of such 
countermeasures.   
Table 3.2: Denial of Information Attack Taxonomy (By Target) 
Intentional Magician’s sleight of hand Perceptual 
Buffers Unintentional Web browser status bar displays information for  
too short a period of time 
Intentional Choosing a long password of random characters Short Term 
Unintentional Forgetting a URL you were just told 
Intentional SPAM from “familiar” sounding source 
Memory 
Long Term 
Unintentional Remembering multiple passwords 
Intentional Using advanced technical jargon to exclude newcomers 
Processing Cognition 
Cognitive Processing 
Unintentional Inability to understand a web search engine’s advanced 
query instruction 
Intentional Blinking Advertisements Vision 
Unintentional Small fonts 




Unintentional Background music at Website 
Intentional Speaking too softly to be eavesdropped on Speech 
Unintentional Inability to speak the language of the listener 




Unintentional Cannot type fast enough 
Intentional An attacker floods an operating system with inbound 
packets, causing some to be dropped 
Processing 
Unintentional Software cannot perform decrypt function fast enough 
and loses connection 
Intentional Smurf attack Input 
Unintentional Slashdot effect 
Intentional Encrypting output so as not to be eavesdropped on  Output 
Unintentional Inability to communicate with a required protocol 
Intentional Corrupting the ROM BIOS of a system Primary Storage 
(ROM/RAM) Unintentional Running too many large applications concurrently 











Table 3.3: Denial of Information Defense Taxonomy (Big Picture) 
  Example 
Lawsuits RIAA sues small-scale MP3 distributors Legal 
New Laws New York State No-Call Database 
Regulatory Government 
Regulation 
FCC approves media consolidation 
PR Campaign Movie industry campaign against movie piracy Moral  
Code of Ethics A state Bar Association imposes Code of Ethics upon its members 
Cultural Communities Exclusion from the group 
Organizational Topic counter-DoI 
groups 
Anti-spam consortium founded 
Financial Increasing cost of 
DoI operations 
Cost of postage increases 
Violence Violence against 
DoI perpetrators 
Sending threatening messages to telemarketing firm 
Technology (see Table 3.4)  
 
 
Because this chapter focuses on technical countermeasures, Table 3.4 goes into much 
greater detail in this area.  Each technique attempts to increase the signal to noise ratio 
and thereby reduce the likelihood of a successful denial of information attack.   
 
Filtering – Filtering is a widely employed technique that removes noise from the 
environment.  Current examples include keyword filtering, Bayesian filtering and 
collaborative filtering.  Another example is human in the loop systems that attempt to 
increase the quality of information by requiring a human representative to review the 
information before it is entered into a database.   
 
Resource Consumption – Resource consumption based defenses force the potential 
attacker to pay a given amount of a finite resource, typically money, processing or time to 
reduce the effectiveness of their attack.  Adaptive and agile systems allow humans to 




resources required for a task.  This savings frees resources that can be used for other 
information countermeasures. Agents shift information-processing requirements from the 
human to information technology allowing the human to focus on other tasks.   
 
Meta-Information – Meta-Information countermeasures attempt to match externally 
computed information with a given set of data. Examples include data quality 
measurements and trust metrics. 
 
Trusted Computing – Trusted computing attempts to ensure the integrity of an 
information node.  If a system is compromised then any information it provides is 
suspect. 
 
Data Fusion – Data fusion attempts to reduce the amount of data presented to a user by 
merging data from disparate sources in a way that produces useful information and 
lessens the cognitive load. 
 
Database Keys/Indices – This technique places emphasis on high-quality database keys 
and indices.  An example is a web search engine that will ban a website that attempts to 
use inappropriate keywords in order to gain better placement. 
 
Online Communities – Individuals join online communities to interact on topics of mutual 
interest.  These communities can apply techniques such as excluding counter-productive 
members and enforcing cultural standards to provide highly relevant information to 





Source Evaluation – Source evaluation techniques attempt to identify authoritative 
sources of information as well as noise generating sources in order to provide higher 
quality information.  This evaluation may include challenge-response techniques or a test 
to determine whether the consumer is a human or machine.  This category also includes 
consideration of source anonymity.  Anonymity of sources is a double-edged sword.  In 
some cases it can lower the quality of the information if the source believes they will 
remain anonymous.  In other cases anonymity will improve the quality of information by 
allowing individuals to speak freely. 
 
Structuring Data – Improved structuring of data allows more efficient retrieval of 
relevant information.  Technologies such as XML embed knowledge into the information 
and subsequently improve the encoding. 
 
Restricted Connectivity – By restricting connectivity, organizations can prevent or reduce 
the opportunity for data corruption.  As an example, an “air-gapped” wide area network 
that provides connectivity to only organizational machines and no open Internet access 
will reduce the threat of direct data corruption to insider threats. 
 
Translating Data – Translations convert data into information that better meets a 
human’s needs.   XML provides a rich set of tools to support transformations.  Other 
examples include middleware that converts between disparate formats and language 





Human Computer Interface – By defending the human computer interface, a user can 
efficiently interact with their machine. An excellent example is information visualization 
which reduces the cognitive burden on the human by presenting data in a more efficient 
graphical representation.  Humans can then make better decisions or discover new 
information.   
 
Data Protection – Systems that detect changes in information or intrusions help build 
trust in the quality of information provided by a given source.  Examples include the 
TripWire system that can detect changes in the files on an information system or the use 
of public key cryptography to protect the integrity of a given document.  More recently, 
detection systems are used in conjunction with “self-healing” technologies to repair 
damage caused by an attack.  The related topic of information preservation seeks to 
safeguard information that may degrade or change over time.  An excellent example is 
the caching of web pages by Google or the Internet WayBack machine that stores 
snapshots of web pages over time. 
 
Locating Data – This technique assists humans in initially finding information as well as 
locating information that they have already spent time and other resources to locate.  This 





Table 3.4: Denial of Information Defense Taxonomy (Technology) 
Collaborative Filtering Slashdot.org 
Filtering Algorithms Link analysis, proximity searches, page 
rank computation 
Filtering 
Human-in-the-Loop Yahoo human reviewers 
Money Charging fee for each email 
Time Sending AI generated email responses to  
spammers 
Memory Adding more RAM to a workstation 
Processing Systems that effect a small computational 
charge to prevent abuse. 





Data quality measurements DOD Guidelines on Data Quality 
Management 
Trust metrics Advogato.org 
Meta-information 
Currency Googlebot/WebCrawlers 
Data Fusion Reduction and merging of data Air Traffic Control, Weather Forecasting 
Exclusivity Orkut.com  
Online Communities Cultural standards of behavior  Slashdot.org 
Anonymous Input The Freenet Project 
Community Input Communities of trust and reputation 
systems 
Authoritative Input Your college professor’s list of 
recommended links 
Hardware/Software Trust Trusted computing 
Source Evaluation 
Authentication/Testing Use of CAPTCHAs to determine if a 
consumer is human. 
Keywords Including keywords with academic papers  
Structuring Data Improved Encoding XML  
Air gapped network Power plant control network Restricted Connectivity 
P2P Communities Waste by WinAmp.com 
Translating Data Converting data to more useful 
form 
XML transforms 
Presenting Data Information Visualization Human Computer Interface 
Interface Design Effective location of interface elements 
Integrity Protection Tripwire Data Protection 
Preservation Historical Archives such as the Internet 
Way Back Machine, Google cache 














We have developed a taxonomy and framework to better understand the objects, actions 
and countermeasures associated with denial of information attacks. Now that we have 
done so, let’s look at two examples of its application. 
 
Spam 
Spam is a prime example of a denial of information attack.  The goal of the human mail 
recipient is to receive emails (information objects) that contain content of interest (signal) 
and exclude others (noise).  The goal of the spammer is to penetrate the countermeasures 
put in place by each recipient to promote their product, service or agenda.  Spammers 
typically send blanket email broadcasts to hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of 
addresses.  This process results in inboxes filled with irrelevant email.  The human must 
spend time cycling through the OODA loop in order to find messages of interest.   
     For our example lets assume that a given human, Alice, has received 47 emails of 
which 6 are of actual interest.  The remaining 41 emails constitute noise.  Of these 41 
emails, 35 are “obvious” spam and the remaining 6 are convincing enough that Alice will 
need to examine them more closely.  Alice’s strategy to review and process email is: 
• Scan email headers 
• Delete obvious Spam 
• Read remaining emails and then decide to delete or keep 
 
     Given this strategy, Alice works with the mail client running on her personal computer 




the process of reading her mail.  Each step in the loop (observe, orient, decide and act) 
requires Alice’s time and other resources to execute.  She will spend significantly more 
time analyzing the “convincing” spam than she will spend deleting the “obvious” spam. 
If Alice’s wasted resources exceed those she has available for her current tasks, she has 
been subject to a successful denial of information attack. 
     Frustrated by the wasted time, Alice employs several countermeasures to help protect 
her.  She attempts to deter spam by getting a new email address and sharing it with only 
her personal friends (restricting connectivity).  She explicitly does not place it on the web 
(addressing/naming).  She builds rules that examine her incoming mail and moves 
messages addressed to her old email address to a lower-priority folder that she scans only 
occasionally (filtering).  She plans to delete the old address after several months when 
she feels confident that the new address has been disseminated to the right people 
(exclusivity/restricted connectivity). She also considers switching mail clients to a text-
based program that runs quickly and has efficient keyboard shortcuts (interface design). 
     Alice is heartened to hear that several laws have been passed making spamming illegal 
and that metered mail is being explored to make spamming less attractive as a business 
(financial/legal).  She is concerned that the charge, albeit small, for email being 
considered may lead to unwelcome charges.  
     In this scenario, spammers are not static enemies.  They employ counter-
countermeasures of their own to keep up with their target’s defenses, a kind of cold-war 
one-upmanship.  They attempt to bypass filters by using compelling, but innocuous 
subject lines, spoofed return addresses and names as well as creative ways to construct 






Groups of individuals and organizations are also affected by denial of information 
attacks.  This can be seen by examining the meta-news website Slashdot.org.  Users of 
this site submit short articles for viewing and comment.  If left unprotected from denial of 
information attacks, the quality of information available on the site would degrade 
quickly. In comparison, consider the low quality of information available on unprotected 
Usenet news groups and unmoderated mailing lists.   Slashdot employs a variety of denial 
of information countermeasures to great effect.  All story submissions are reviewed by 
Slashdot staff (human in the loop) for relevance and interesting content.  Only the best 
are selected for publication.  Once published, users comment on the story.  A randomly 
selected subset of users have the ability to rate the quality of each comment (collaborative 
filtering).  Comments submitted by registered users (authentication) receive higher initial 
ratings than those submitted by anonymous users (anonymous input).  Readers may 
easily filter stories at any rating threshold from -1 very poor quality to 5 excellent quality. 
(data quality metrics, filtering algorithms, interface design).  Standards of acceptable 
usage of the system have evolved over time and contribute to the unique culture and 
quality of the site. (cultural standards of behavior) 
     Long after a story is published, it is still available (preservation) and can be found via 
a search mechanism on the website (searching) or with a URL which links directly to the 
story (keeping found things found).  
 
As we have seen, denial of information is a large problem with a wide range of potential 
solutions.  The remainder of this dissertation will explore the use of one such solution, 




security related data.  The next chapter begins this exploration by closely examining the 









INFORMATION VISUALIZATION THREAT MODEL 
 
Information visualization systems are a powerful tool for countering denial of 
information attacks, but to do so they must be designed with security in mind. Such 
systems are vulnerable to attack, either from malicious entities attempting to overwhelm, 
mislead or distract the human viewer or from non-malicious entities that accomplish the 
same result by accident.  Some might believe that today’s systems are not potential 
targets for attack.  Clearly there are many domains where security is of minimal 
importance, but increasingly information visualization systems are being used to support 
critical decision making.  For example, intelligence analysis, law enforcement, network 
security and business decision-support systems exist in an adversarial environment where 
it is likely that malicious entities are actively attempting to manipulate human end users.  
We believe that there is a clear threat today and there will be a growing problem into the 
foreseeable future.  For information visualization systems to maintain relevance security 
must be considered. Information visualization systems inherently have the human tightly 
coupled in the system loop.  In most cases, the human is the decision maker who will act 
upon (or not act upon) the information presented and, as a result, the human is a high-
payoff and likely target.  Any point in the information visualization system may be 
attacked, from data collection to processing to final visualization, in order to impact 
human interpretation.  A “minor” compromise of a single bit may have significant impact 
on the human (consider a change in the foreground color of a scatter plot to the 




to identify these threats and vulnerabilities, as well as develop principles to counter or 
mitigate these attacks.  By identifying the threats and weaknesses of their system, 
designers can make appropriate decisions to mitigate these vulnerabilities.   
     To see a sample attack in action, consider a visual intrusion detection system designed 
to supplement classical anomaly-based and signature-based intrusion detection systems.  
Such systems are typically co-located with a firewall at the border between the internal 
institutional network and the public Internet.  This vantage point allows the system to 
observe and collect selected data from network traffic at entry and egress from the 
internal network.  Our example system collects header data from network traffic and 
visualizes it in real-time.  In particular, it captures the source and destination addresses of 
communicating network nodes, network protocols in use, source and destination ports 
(used for process to process communication across an Internet Protocol (IP) network, e.g. 
port 80 for a web server) as well as calculates a timestamp for each record.  An adversary 
may easily inject arbitrary data into the visualization system, intermingled with legitimate 
users’ traffic, due to weaknesses in current networking protocols.   In our example, the 
adversary knows the system operator on the night shift is red-green colorblind.  They also 
know that the default settings on the visualization system map the very common (99+% 
of traffic) Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) to green, the User Datagram Protocol 
(UDP) to blue and the Internet Control Management (ICMP) protocol to red.  In addition, 
the attacker knows that the target node has serious ICMP and UDP vulnerabilities.  The 
attacker waits until late in the operator’s shift and launches an ICMP based attack.  The 
already tired operator does not notice the red packet amidst the much greater noise of 
green packets.  In this case, the attacker took advantage of the visualization system’s 




We will describe and illustrate these attacks in later sections.   
     To help combat usability attacks against visualization systems this chapter includes 
several novel contributions:  a framework for information visualization system security 
analysis, a taxonomy of malicious attacks as well as technology independent principles 
for designing information visualization systems that will resist attack.  We illustrate and 
validate these contributions with results from the design, implementation and real-world 
use of our security visualization system.   
     Information visualization systems are potentially vulnerable to a wide spectrum of 
attacks ranging from overt to subtle.  An obvious attack is to simply corrupt the data.  
Akin to a denial of service (DoS) attack, an attack of this nature is likely to be 
immediately noticed by human users.  While significant, in this chapter we are concerned 
with the more subtle denial of information attack.  Denial of information (DoI) attacks 
target the human by exceeding their perceptual, cognitive and motor capabilities.  They 
reduce the ability of a human to acquire desired information. Even if a traditional DoS 
attack against a machine is not possible, the human utilizing the machine to process 
information may still succumb to a DoI attack.  Typically much more subtle (and 
potentially much more dangerous), DoI attacks can actively alter the decision making of 
human visualization system users without their knowledge.  More specifically, for any 
visualization system, if an attacker can inject data into the dataset being visualized, or 
otherwise alter the dataflow, there exists the potential to exploit vulnerabilities in the 
human or the machine system.  This exploitation can be used to accomplish some or all 
of the following high-level goals (inspired by well-established military information 
operations doctrine [3]):   




• Block the system user's perception and/or identification of objects or actions 
being introduced into the visualization system.  
• Reinforce the system user's preconceived beliefs.  
• Distract the system user's attention from other activities.  
• Overload the visualization system or user’s data collection and analytical 
capabilities.  
• Create the illusion of strength where weakness exists.  
• Create the illusion of weakness where strength exists.  
• Accustom the system user to particular patterns of behavior that are exploitable at 
the time of the malicious entities choosing.  
• Confuse the system user’s expectations about an object’s attributes and actions.  
In particular, to effect surprise in these areas. 
• Reduce the system user's ability gain situational awareness and effectively make 
decisions.  
     To accomplish these goals, we make a key assumption:  malicious entities may insert 
data into the dataset being visualized as well as deny access to, corrupt or alter the 
timeliness of data generated and communicated by networked data sources. We believe 
these assumptions to be reasonable.  Many visualization systems gather information from 
potentially untrustworthy sources (such as unauthenticated Internet users or physically 
insecure sensors).  In addition, data integrity and data availability are likewise susceptible 
to manipulation both in storage and in transit. Current cryptographic techniques can, if 
properly implemented, protect the integrity of data, but cannot guarantee availability.  
Consider that a small network device in the path of data flow can slow down or speed up 




could be unplugged at tactically important times.  Given these assumptions, it is 
important to note that we will not concentrate on the more traditional, non-malicious 
problems associated with designing information visualization systems as we believe they 
are currently being addressed.  In most cases the problem of DoI attacks will remain even 
if these issues are addressed.  Nor will we address general system attacks designed to 
broadly compromise as this is well addressed by the systems security community. 
     We argue that the ultimate goal of attacks against information visualization systems is 
to overload and deceive the human end users and force them to make incorrect 
conclusions and to take incorrect actions -- the exact antithesis of the goal of most 
information visualization system designers.  This manipulation can be accomplished in a 
variety of ways, but ultimately these attacks corrupt data or alter dataflow in some way. 
They may occur quickly or over a long period at a barely perceptible, low level. The 
manipulation may take place at data generation, in transit over a communication network, 
at rest on a data storage device or during processing by a visualization engine.  Attacks 
may be aggressive and essentially deny productive use of the system or may be subtle 
and covertly mislead.  Either way, the result of an attack is an inaccurate picture as 
interpreted by the human end user.  We have extensively reviewed these attacks and, for 
purposes of this chapter, we will place emphasis on the more subtle attacks, but will also 
provide coverage of interesting more aggressive attacks.  Aggressive attacks are almost 
certain to be noticed, but subtle attacks are more insidious and may be overlooked for an 
extended period of time.  As a result, the negative impact of these attacks may be far 
greater. 
     The threats to information visualization systems are legion. Attackers may range from 




curiosity, intelligence gathering, notoriety, intellectual challenge or financial gain.  To 
counter these attackers we argue that the only path to secure systems is via a thorough 
understanding of the possible threats and countermeasures.  An effective technique to 
help secure systems is to conduct a threat analysis.  Typically, this analysis includes the 
following elements:  identifying assets you wish to protect, brainstorming known threats 
to the system, ranking the threats by severity, choosing how to respond to threats and 
choosing techniques and technologies (if any) to mitigate the threats [57].  We will 






Figure 4.1. Generic producer-consumer information visualization system.  Attacks influence any 
component, but the human end-user is the ultimate target. 
 
SYSTEM MODEL 
To best understand how attackers can accomplish the high-level goals presented in the 
previous section and to analyze how malicious visualizations manifest, we developed a 
generic producer-consumer information visualization system using a holistic systems 
approach (Figure 4.1).  This architectural overview is useful for identifying assets by 
decomposing visualization systems and applications.  The results can then be used to 
identify and prioritize the implementation of countermeasures. 




information to the human using a visualization method that relies on one of the human’s 
senses (typically vision).  The human interacts with the interface using motor and speech 
commands and will draw conclusions based upon the information presented.  The 
producer is the source of the data that will be visualized.  In some cases, the producer will 
include a human who interacts with an information system to produce all or a portion of 
the data that will ultimately be visualized.  In other cases, the producer will consist of 
only an information system that generates the data. No human is directly involved in data 
production (e.g. a sensor network).  The producer may be co-located with the consumer, 
but it is more likely that the producer will need to communicate the data to the consumer 
via a communication channel.   
     Each human and machine component processes data using subcomponents with finite 
resources.  Attacks can target any of these resources.  For the human, we chose to model 
these resources based on the Model Human Processor (MHP) architecture:  short term 
memory, long-term memory, cognition as well as perception and motor processing [16].  
For each machine, we used the common information systems model of machine 
resources:  processing, short-term storage (RAM) and long-term storage (typically optical 
or magnetic storage media).  The human and its associated information system interact 
through the classic human-computer interaction boundary.  The human utilizes vision, 
hearing, speech and motor actions to interact with the information system.  Other senses 
(e.g. touch and smell) are not shown in the model, due to the limited availability of 
effective interface technologies.  The information system provides related input/output 
devices that support each of these human capabilities (e.g. CRT, speakers/sound sub-




Target Attacks Possible Countermeasures 
Perceptual 
Buffers 
Force desired colors to be used 
 
Force smaller font 
Review annotation algorithms 
 
Limit range of colors, sizes 
allowed 
 
Review preattentive literature for 
best interface objects 
Short Term Display updates to rapidly Compensate with buffers in the 
visualization system 
Memory 
Long Term Aggregation hides important 
detail 
 
Scaling lacks detailed enough 
resolution 
 
Attack paging of visualizations 
Lack of long term overviews 
 
Background images of historical 
data 
 
Use of paged and side-by-side 
images and overlays 
 
Create smart book of visual 
signatures 
Processing Cognition 
Cognitive Processing Degrade trust in system 
 





Visualization software causes 
poor conceptual model 
 
Display visualization’s source 
data 
 
Create visual log files 
Ambient visualization 
Input Vision Causing occlusion of visual 
elements to conceal or manipulate 
visual presentation 
 
Inserting random noise into 
visualization  
 
Force less detailed scaling 
 
Occlusion of visualization 
elements 
 
Color choices impact color blind 
user 
Develop alternative 
visualizations and views of data 
 
Include customizable filters 
 
Provide multiple coordinated 
views of data 
 
Choose smart default settings 
 
Human 
Output Motor Cause alert which forces user 
motor response (e.g. clicking an 
OK button) 
 
Force the user to scroll 
 
UI requires unnecessary actions 
Review improved triggering 
mechanisms 
 
Explore alterative interface 
designs 
 




INFORMATION VISUALIZATION ATTACK TAXONOMY 
While attacks may range from overt to subtle, they share several common properties:  
they attempt to influence how you visualize, what you visualize or when you visualize.  
To this end, we present a taxonomy of attacks that follows the flow of information from 
human consumption back to initial data generation.  We have developed a comprehensive 
taxonomy of attacks, but for purposes of this chapter, we provide a representative 
overview of the taxonomy and illustrative examples to highlight the vulnerabilities and 
surprisingly effective exploits of traditional information visualization systems.  We have 
chosen to follow the information flow from the human back towards data generation, 
believing that this is an intuitive and natural way to illustrate an interesting spectrum of 
attacks. We will use the components along the path (see Table 4.1) to illustrate how and 
when attacks may manifest. Attacks may influence any component, but the human end-
user is the ultimate target.   
ATTACKING THE HUMAN 
Humans are vulnerable targets with finite resources to perceive, interpret and act upon 
information.  Attackers consume these resources through information visualization 
systems by altering the accuracy, completeness, consistency and timeliness of 
information flows.  By focusing on human limitations these alterations create incomplete, 
ambiguous or incorrect visualizations that result in frustrated analysis, reasoning and 
decision-making. These malicious visualizations increase complexity, alter or destroy 
patterns, distort sequences and disrupt exploratory tasks which in turn may cause 
confusion, disorientation, disbelief, distraction or lack of trust. While not necessary, the 




unique set of weaknesses and predispositions (consider our colorblind user from earlier in 
the chapter).  The following sections examine attacks against the human using a slightly 
streamlined version of the Model Human Processor (MHP) model of cognitive 
processing, memory, vision and motor resources. 
 
 
Figure 4.2.  Semantic zoom visualization of network traffic.   
 
Attacking Human Memory 
Humans possess a limited ability to remember information over short and long periods of 
time.  Arguably, humans can remember 7 +/- 2 “chunks” over a short period [76].  
Regardless of the exact number, the human has a finite capability to retain and recall 
information.  By exploiting this limitation an attacker can greatly increase their likelihood 
of success. These attacks may manifest themselves gradually such that the user fails to 
see the pattern.  Alternatively attacks may target the users ability to recall legitimate 




limitation.   This system, designed by the authors, attempts to provide a semantic 
zooming capability [11] for network traffic by allowing the user to view network 
information at variety of different scales from course grain overviews to high-resolution 
detail.  The user selects the level of resolution using the scale on the right of the interface.     
Despite this attempt at allowing users to compare network traffic, it suffers from 
limitations of human memory.  In our tests using the current configuration, users simply 
could not retain the context from one level to the next. Attackers could clearly exploit this 
weakness.  To the best of our knowledge, no security visualization systems directly 
support the ability to closely compare images for subtle differences required to detect this 
class of attack.  While Unix systems can use the diff command to compare text files, 
there is no equivalent visual diff.  Likewise, there are no security visualization systems 
that allow users to seamlessly compare images in a side-by-side manner frustrating 
effective comparison. 
Attacking Cognitive Processing 
Cognitive processing deals with how humans interpret information.  By exploiting 
weaknesses in this processing, an attacker can mislead the human and obscure or 
camouflage attacks as well as lead users to incorrect conclusions, perhaps even 
frustrating the users to the point they abandon use of the system altogether.    Attacks can 
target attention, perception of time, decision-making, pattern recognition and perception 
of color and shape.  Attackers may increase cognitive complexity, add spurious packets 
to eliminate suspicious outliers or demand the attention of the user.  The following 






By their nature, information visualization systems require human attention.  Depending 
on the design of the visualization and user interface the system may likely be tightly 
coupled with the user. It is impossible for a user to maintain 100% focus on their 
visualization system for long periods of time.  Even a distraction lasting a few seconds 
can cause a user to miss key information.  Alternatively, the attacker may overwhelm the 
user by demanding too much attention. 
 
“Cry Wolf” Attack:  From the classic children’s story, an attacker can trigger activity, 
which in a normal scenario would require user attention.  As a result, if the system “cries 
wolf” enough times the operator will begin to lose trust and may disable the system 
altogether.  As an example, an attacker may subvert the snort intrusion detection system 
by creating packets that trigger alerts [87].  Snort alerts the user when it detects a 
signature in network activity that matches a known attack in its database. The snot tool is 
specifically designed to attack users through snort [95]. Utilizing snort’s database of 
signatures, snot can generate network traffic that matches alert rules.  Using snot, an 







Figure 4.3:  Binary rainfall visualization of network packets. (One packet per row) 
 
 
Displacement Attack: Displacement attacks occur in visualizations where incoming data 
visually displaces older information.  These visualizations are particularly susceptible to 
the limitations of human attention.  Figure 4.3 is a network monitoring and intrusion 
detection visualization from the RUMINT system that displays network traffic in a 
scrolling display.  The bits of packets are plotted on the horizontal axis.  As each packet 
arrives it is plotted one pixel lower on the vertical axis.  When the display reaches the 
bottom of the display window, it begins plotting at the top of the display, overwriting 
previous contents.  During the past year we have used this system in two operational 
settings.  The first was with the Georgia Tech Honeynet and the second was with a 




instances, the network connection is not used for any legitimate traffic thus only 
malicious activity is seen.  Network packets typically arrive in small groups averaging 
one to five minutes per packet.  Scrolling in these instances is typically not a problem, as 
approximately 24 hours of traffic can be seen before older information is overwritten 
(although we have seen spikes in traffic where network activity has been significantly 
greater).  To test the time required for an attacker to scroll information off the page we 
conducted several experiments and found that it required only 2-3 seconds to overwrite 
information on one of our research machines (AMD 2500+, Windows XP, 1GB RAM, 
100MB Ethernet).  It is important to note that the theoretical limit based on network 
bandwidth alone is on the order of ten-thousandths of a second.  We believe that a small 
lapse in attention on the order of seconds, even by a dedicated observer, is a reasonable 
possibility that an attacker may exploit to destroy traces of malicious activity. 
Attacking Visual Perception 
Information visualization systems, and the great majority of interactive computing 
applications, rely heavily upon the human’s perceptual capabilities.  Visual perception is 
the processing of input stimuli based upon reflected wavelengths of light from which our 
brain constructs internal representations of the outside world [20].   By taking advantage 
of the strengths and weaknesses of visual perception, an attacker can alter this internal 
representation.  Consider the optical illusions from classic psychology.  Given the same 
input image, different subjects might interpret the picture differently.  In other examples, 
subjects are unable to correctly judge spatial relationships.  See the work by Bach for 52 
online examples [6].  Examples of other known weakness include a blind spot in the 




colors.  Even adaptations, which can be considered strengths in some instances, become 
weaknesses when manipulated by an adversary, such as preattentive processing [55] and 
afterimages caused by light/dark adaptation [77].  Beyond simple manipulation, even 
more aggressive attacks are possible.  Small delays in virtual reality visualization systems 
can cause queasiness [52] and fifteen to twenty frames per second of certain images can 
trigger photosensitive epilepsy.  
 
 
Figure 4.4: Binary visualization of two JPEG files.  The left image is unaltered and the right image 
contains a steganographic message.  Bytes from files are mapped to 256-level grayscale pixels. 
 
Color Mapping Attack:  The color mapping attack targets the use of color in 
visualizations.  Humans have a limited ability to discriminate between colors, on the 
order of 300,000 colors [77].  Not all of these colors are interpreted as equivalent values, 
some are given heavier weight or draw more attention than others, and because color 
ranges are not uniform, normalization is used to help counteract the effect.  See the work 
of Rogowitz and Treinish for an excellent discussion [89].  Most computing systems can 




today’s hardware.  Depending on the visualization system in use, features of the data are 
mapped, in a variety of ways, to colors used in the display.  Limited display colors allow 
an attacker to hide activity due to aggregation.  Large numbers of colors exceed or 
degrade the ability of humans to glean appropriate insights.  It is due to these system 
presentation and human interpretation gaps that users are vulnerable, particularly when 
the system provides only a limited ability to customize colors for given tasks. Figure 4.4 
comes from an analysis system we created to visualize executable files.  It maps byte 
values from binary files to 256-level gray-scale pixels.  In this example, the figure shows 
the file structure of two jpeg files.  The left image is unaltered and the right image 
contains a steganographic message.  Despite our ability to distinguish hundreds of 
thousands of colors, in our experiments, users were unable to find the modified bits.  For 
future work we plan to pursue a visual diff tool, but the fact remains that for even a small 
number of colors, humans have difficulty in detecting differences.  This weakness allows 
malicious entities to operate below the detectable threshold.  Even the addition of a color 
legend is of little value. In a separate experiment we plotted network packets on a scatter 
plot using a commercial system.  Even with only 100 different colors mapped to packet 
features (colors were chosen by the system) and a color legend, users took considerable 
time to match the respective color to the appropriate value.   In another experiment, using 
the same commercial system and a scatter plot, we plotted 1,358 different network 
packets.  We exceeded the number of categorical colors the system could provide and 
were forced to use a continuous scale.  In this mode, no legend was provided.  It proved 











Figure 4.6: Autoscale and motor resources attack example.  Note the targeted network services, 





Attacking Motor Resources 
This class of attack attempts to consume time and increase frustration by forcing user 
motor actions.   Attacks may be as simple as forcing paging across multiple screens.   
Consider the RUMINT system described in the displacement attack, but add a buffer that 
stores previous pages of images.   As each screen is filled, the user must interact with the 
interface to observe previous activity.  Another example is to force user thrashing by 
requiring constant swapping from detail to context and back.  Figures 4.5 and 4.6 
illustrate this attack.  The dataset behind these figures comes from an unclassified 
attack/defend exercise, in which a National Security Agency red team attacked student-
defended networks [116].  The user is presented with an overview of network activity in 
Figure 4.5, but to see the specific port-level the network activity in Figure 4.6 the user 
must zoom in and then back out to continue to monitor the overview.  In this example the 
user would have to perform this operation ten times just to monitor the 1024 privileged 
ports on a Unix system. 
Targeting Specific Humans 
While the attacks described previously are significant, even more effective attacks are 
possible if the specific human user is known.  With this knowledge, an adversary may 
craft an attack that specifically exploits their target’s weaknesses.  Vision, memory, 
reflexes, experience and intelligence vary greatly between individuals.  Even partial 
knowledge of the specific end user gives the adversary an advantage; their attack may be 
markedly different for a 19-year-old male intern, a 37-year-old male disgruntled 




that some degree of knowledge of the human user to be a reasonable assumption.  A few 
casual questions asked at an after-hours happy hour frequented by company employees 
would likely gain useful information.  A comprehensive discussion of all such attacks is 
beyond the scope of this chapter, but we will illustrate the vulnerability by examining 
photosensitive epilepsy.  While this condition is relatively rare, it does illustrate the 
increased risk when the attacker can target specific people and their weaknesses.  We 
argue that related attacks can be launched when age, gender and/or medical details are 
known about users. 
 
Extreme Information Overload Attack (Photosensitive Epilepsy): Epilepsy has a lifetime 
prevalence of about 3% and approximately 2.3 million people in the United States have 
the condition.  Of this population, a percentage has photosensitive epilepsy.  People with 
photosensitive epilepsy are susceptible to seizures brought on by rapidly flickering or 
flashing displays.  In the late 1990’s, thousands of people were sickened with nausea and 
dizziness by a Japanese Pokemon cartoon.  In addition, there were 685 cases of apparent 
epileptic seizures [54].    The risk extends beyond the viewing of shows on televisions 
and computer monitors.  Video games have also induced seizures and many now carry 
warning labels.   It is important to note that the video game and video industries have 
since taken other proactive measures to limit future incidents; reducing the overall 
incidence of the problem.  For example, the Pokemon cartoons were reviewed, frame-by-
frame, before rebroadcast in the United States [52].  An attacker would do the opposite.  
Research by Harding indicates that the larger the area of the retina covered with the 
flashing display, the greater the likelihood of a seizure.  In particular, flashing at the rate 




people with photosensitive epilepsy were sensitive at this frequency.  In addition to 
flashing, static patterns have induced seizures and the likelihood is dramatically increased 
when patterns are updated at the rate of 15-20 changes per second [54].  With the trend 
toward larger displays and higher resolution the situation is worsened.  In our 
experiments we were able to generate network traffic that caused both static and updating 
patterns in our network visualization system that would possibly induce seizures in some 
photosensitive epileptics, but we did not proceed further due to safety concerns.   
ATTACKING VISUALIZATION HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE 
The attacker affects attacks against the human by influencing how information is 
visualized.  As was the case for humans, the notion of specificity is important to consider.  
Many of the techniques described below are most effective when used against specific 








Figure 4.7: View of the “Spinning Cube of Potential Doom” a 3-D visualization of network traffic 





Processing attacks target the algorithms used to process and present the visualization.  
These algorithms range from simple graphic routines to advanced artificial intelligence or 
machine learning techniques.  Attacks may be designed to increase computational 
complexity, e.g. creating a large number of objects such that the interface becomes 
sluggish or the visualization delays presentation of important information.  Others may 
exploit intelligence embedded in the visualization system.  Consider a generic spring 
layout algorithm.  To be most effective, this algorithm relies upon the graph to reach a 
stable state.  Carefully constructed packets could be used to force constant 
destabilization. Other attacks may take advantage of bugs in the code or the calculations 
in use, such as interpolation or round-off.  To provide a concrete example of the efficacy 
of these classes of attack, the following section illustrates the round-off attack in detail. 
 
round-off attack:  Consider the “spinning cube of potential doom” visualization system in 
Figure 4.7 [69].  Designed to provide insight into network attacks, it displays network 
traffic along three axes.  The X-axis represents the destination IP addresses for a Class C 
network (65536 possible addresses), the Y-Axis displays destination ports from 0-65535 
and the Z-axis displays source Internet addresses from 0.0.0.0 - 223.255.255.255 (no 
multicast).   Assuming an approximate 1024 pixels for each axis.  The X and Y axes 
round off 6 bits of information, leaving an opening for an attacker to operate within a 
space of 64 indistinguishable positions.  More importantly, the Z axis rounds off 
approximately 22 bits of information, grouping source IP’s into buckets of over 4 million 




source IP addresses and, due to round off, would only illuminate a single pixel.  Note also 
that the visualization is also a target for a color mapping attack.  It uses a “rainbow” color 
map representing TCP connection instances.  Although a large number of colors are used, 
the actual color does not have “any meaning.”    
Attacking the Visualization 
The heart of a visualization system are the visualizations it presents to the user.  Closely 
intertwined with processing attacks, attacks against the visualization design will have an 
immediate effect on the user.  Some visualizations were simply not designed to convey a 
certain type of activity, so an attacker may easily operate with impunity.  In other cases, 
the design is such that a small amount of malicious data can destroy or reduce the 
effectiveness of the system.  Designers are faced with large, potentially massive, datasets 
and limited screen real estate to present information and are forced to make design 
tradeoffs that can be exploited.  The following are examples of such attacks. 
 
autoscale attack:  Many visualization systems use autoscaling algorithms to provide an 
optimal display of information.  Typically the algorithms zoom the perspective outward 
to display the entire dataset.    While this is convenient in many cases, an attacker can 
easily exploit this vulnerability.  The image shown in Figure 4.5 was created by the 
xmgrace open source information visualization tool [47].  A small number of packets sent 
by the attackers to those ports above 40,000, forced the autoscaling algorithm to zoom 





jamming attack:  The jamming attack is a simple attack, akin to a visual denial of service.  
By observing what aspects of the dataset are used to control the physical location of 
objects on the screen visual noise can be inserted to partially or completely corrupt the 
information display.  As noise is inserted, insightful patterns, relationships, anomalies, 
outliers and trends will disappear.  We produced multiple versions of this class of attack 
in our network visualization system by generating network packets with appropriate 
headers. Figure 4.8(a) is a parallel coordinate plot of TCP/UDP ports.  The left axis 
shows the attacker’s source ports and the right axis shows the target machine’s ports (on 
a 0-65535 scale).  The image shows two jamming attacks, both done using the packit 
packet creation tool [15].  The first attack generated 200 UDP packets (in orange) with 
random source and destination ports.  The second attack (in green) generated 2000 TCP 
packets from a single source port, but random destination ports.   
 
occlusion attack:  Occlusion is a problem in many visualizations, particularly those in 
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frequent shortcoming to hide malicious activity.  In the Figure 4.8(b), an attacker’s 
malicious activity is hidden behind newer activity. 
 
labeling attack:  Typically visualizations provide the ability to label the image.  
Depending on the labeling algorithm in use, this fact can be exploited.  One popular 
commercial visualization system defaults to only 20 labels.  If the user does not change 
this setting a large number of objects will not be labeled, greatly complicating user 
interpretation.  See Figure 4.8(c) for an example.  At the other end of the spectrum, some 
labeling algorithms do not limit the number of labels used and, by injecting extra data, an 
attack could cause the display to be obscured.   
 
GUI widget attack:  User interfaces only provide a limited ability to interact with the 
dataset.  An attacker can exploit this limitation and prevent users from detecting 
malicious activity despite their best attempts.  Figure 4.8(d) shows a cluster of network 
activity; because of the large range of values in the overall dataset (not shown), the user 
is unable to zoom in any further.  Any movement of the sliders will cause the entire 
cluster to move off the screen.  Note the two red circles.  Each circle shows a double-







From our research, storage attacks against information visualization systems can occur 
primarily in the form of classic denial of service.  Denial of information and not denial of 
service is the focus of this chapter so we will touch only briefly on it here.  Every 
information system has a finite amount of storage.  By consuming all or most of this 
storage an attacker may subvert the intent of the visualization system.  In the network 
security domain, a classic example is flooding the network with traffic, sometimes 
legitimate (also known as the slashdot effect) and sometimes malicious (trigger logging 
events to the point that the hard disk fills or malicious activity is overwritten).  Variants 
include filling up the buffers of network interface cards such that packets are dropped or 
consuming RAM to the point that the operating system needs to page memory to disk (or 
even thrash).  All of these attacks negatively impact performance and could crash or slow 
the system.   While not strictly a storage attack, it is well documented that, in shared user 
systems, one user’s applications can consume resources to the performance detriment of 
other users. Correctly designed interfaces operate within very strict timing parameters 
and a sluggish interface (or visualization) that quickly becomes difficult or unusable 
could quickly occur. 
Attacking Data Generation and Communication  
By definition, information visualization systems present data to the user in order to 
provide insight.  If the accuracy, reliability, timeliness, completeness or currency is 
threatened then the entire system is at risk.  Attacking data quality early in the system 
flow is a means to an end and not and end unto itself. The tainted data will ultimately 




and hence negatively impact task accomplishment.  Recall that we do not consider data 
corruption attacks as we believe that they will be easily detected.   
Attacking Data Generation 
In our model, data can come from human and machine producers, both of which may 
prove unreliable despite the best intentions of the system designer.  This notion is directly 
opposite to the common assumption that the “source must be good.”  While not the focus 
of this chapter, physical attacks are the most straightforward attack.  The most basic is 
physical destruction or theft which causes a failure to record data. More subtly, an 
attacker may spuriously add, remove or compromise information producing nodes via 
physical access or network attack.  Consider physically turning a sensor on and off (or 
cutting power) which results in selected subsets of data being recorded.  Note that this 
could occur with more than one sensor and provides the attacker the ability to paint a 
customized and comprehensive picture of the information space.  Beyond physical 
access, we consider attacks that allow an attacker to operate remotely.   
 
sensor blindness attack:  Network-based blindness attacks allow an attacker to remotely 
crash selected packet capture sensors on the network.  As an example, virtually all 
Windows-based network sniffing programs use the WinPcap [124] packet capture library.  
Versions of the library have known vulnerabilities that will crash the sensor. 
 
 selective sensor blindness attack:  Similar to the sensor blindness attack this variant 
exploits differing operating system implementations of the network processing stack to 




incorrect TCP checksum while another will silently ignore it.  This inconsistency allows 
network intruders to operate without detection if the network sensor ignores the packet 
and a target machine accepts it.  For more information see the work of Ptacek and 
Newsham [88]. 
 
spoofing source identity attack:  Spoofing source identity is another common 
vulnerability, usually due to weak access controls or authentication, that allows users or 
network systems to appear as legitimate producers.  In the network domain, it is trivially 
easy to spoof IP packets.  The protocol offers no protection and an attacker may transmit 
packets with spoofed source addresses that appear to come from legitimate sources. 
 
interface spoofing attack:  Interface spoofing attacks have existed since the beginning of 
shared computing systems.  Typically they are used to trick legitimate users into 
revealing sensitive information, such as passwords.  In the context of this chapter, they 
can be used to trick legitimate users into submitting incorrect data to the visualization 
system.  This technique can be seen when employing a variant of current phishing 
attacks.  An attacker could send an email to a legitimate producer asking them to use a 
new website to submit information.  Normal cues from the browser, such as the status 
bar, can be spoofed to prevent detection.  See the work of Levy for more detail on this 
class of attack [70]. 
 
sampling rate attack:  Sampling rate attacks exploit the periodicity of data collection.  
Due to the high rate of data flow observed by some sensors, by necessity, sample data at 




in near real time systems, a five minute sampling rate is common.  By gaining an 
understanding of when data is sampled, an attacker can avoid detection. 
 
poisoned data attack:  Poisoned data attacks are carefully crafted to inject a small amount 
of malformed  or incorrect data to disrupt collection or analysis.  These vulnerabilities 
may exist due to a lack of input validation at the producer as well as the consumer’s 
system. As we mentioned earlier, a single legal packet can have significant impact on the 
end user, as was seen in the autoscale attack.  The same can be accomplished with a small 
amount of seemingly legal, but maliciously formed data.  An excellent example, is the 
recent spate of image files that exploit vulnerabilities in image processing libraries.  A 
single such image can crash a visualization application or provide privileged access to the 
attacker. 
Attacking the Communication Channel 
Communication channels connect the information producing nodes to the information 
visualization system.  Long a subject of network security discussion, there are a large 
number of vulnerabilities in current networking protocols.  If communication links are 
not secured with message confidentiality and integrity protection, an adversary may 
easily perform a “man in the middle” attack and arbitrarily alter packets between the 
producer and the information visualization system.  Also, as we have discussed, the 
network layer (IP) provides virtually no protection from spoofing source identity and 
other tampering.  Common transport layer protocols (TCP and UDP), similarly provide 
limited protection. UDP makes no attempt.  TCP relies upon the three-way handshake 




establishment provides only limited protection as an attacker can employ well-known 
TCP session hijacking techniques.  Due to these weaknesses, an attacker can alter 
messages between producer and consumer at will, as well as observe all message traffic, 
unless some form of cryptographic protection is used.  Even if a secured protocol is used, 
most will still be vulnerable to the following timing attack. 
 
channel timing attack:  By placing a properly configured network device in-line along the 
communication channel between the producer and the consumer, an attacker may affect a 
number of timing based attacks.  The channel timing attack allows the capture and replay, 
both faster and slower than actual, of network traffic.  By altering the timeliness of how 
and when data is presented to users, an attacker may reduce or increase data density or 
alter the distribution of data values causing a direct impact on the visualization and the 
human.  Time-series data is particularly vulnerable to this class of attack.  
 
PRINCIPLES FOR COUNTERING MALICIOUS VISUALIZATIONS  
 There is no panacea that will absolutely protect information visualization systems from 
attack, but there are important design principles and assumptions that will mitigate the 
risk.  Recall that any information visualization system in which a trusted or untrusted 
adversary can inject or modify information places the end user at risk.  As we conducted 
the research associated with this chapter we designed a variety of security information 
visualization systems and fielded them in operational settings. As a result of this 
experience we have learned a number of lessons.  As you design or redesign systems of 




they will greatly reduce the likelihood of many classes of successful attack.  In other 
instances, there is no clear-cut solution and the only countermeasure is awareness of the 
vulnerability. 
     From our experience, often the initial design of the system itself was at fault, leading 
to easily exploitable vulnerabilities such as the displacement attack.  Others are more 
difficult to implement and potentially require detailed information about the system in 
use or the specific user.  By using these principles and considering these assumptions 
during design, threats may be pruned or reduced and prudent design tradeoffs may be 
made.  Ultimately, as information visualization systems are used for critical applications 
we must continue to explore how we can effectively deal with threats in order to make 
such systems more secure and relevant. 
EDUCATE THE USER 
The user is the ultimate target of attackers and the success or failure of an attack depends, 
in large part, upon their individual susceptibility.  To counter many forms of attack, train 
users to be alert for manipulation, aware of their personal weaknesses and to take 
maximum advantage of system customization capabilities to counter these weaknesses. 
As a result, users will be better protected and resistant to attack. The intelligence 
community uses similar techniques to help prevent successful social engineering attacks 




ASSUME AN INTELLIGENT, WELL INFORMED ADVERSARY 
Information visualization systems of any import will be targets of attack.  Underestimate 
the attacker at your own risk [19].  To best protect a system we must assume an 
intelligent and well-informed adversary.  The attacker may gain information through 
open-source (publicly available information) or through social engineering.  Seemingly 
unimportant data may prove to be extremely valuable.  As an example, such information 
as the time lunch was served and the location of the dining hall, both considered to be 
trivial pieces of information, possibly enhanced the attack on the USS Cole.  It is not 
unrealistic to assume that an attacker knows the visualization tool in use.  This 
assumption is strengthened in areas where a single tool dominates or there is a lack of 
diversity.  In some cases, the attacker may possess the tool itself and the source code.  
This access allows an adversary full knowledge of it’s operational characteristics and 
implementation vulnerabilities (buffer sizes, defaults, scaling algorithms, color mapping 
etc.)  This assumption also applies to your users, the same social techniques that are used 
to gather technical information can also be used to gain insight into specific operators and 
environmental conditions.  An intelligent and well-informed adversary will target your 
specific system through its weakest link, at the worst time with the weakest user at the 
controls.  The best defense is to look at your system through the eyes of an attacker, 
predict their likely attack courses of action and consider what you can do to counter or 
frustrate their actions. 
DESIGN THE SYSTEM TO PROTECT THE USER. 
Assume the system, including the implementation and supporting information flow (from 




a visualization system or technique should consider malicious applications and seek to 
create well thought out visualizations that are resistant to attack.  At the time of creation, 
system designers do not necessarily know the full range of future use.  Assume your 
system will be used for critical applications and attempt to predict second and third order 
effects.   
     Visualization systems typically have the human tightly coupled in the decision making 
loop.  These systems require the limited resources of human attention and time, use them 
wisely.  Even a small consumption of these resources by an adversary can cause 
unintended consequences on human decision-making.  Customizable systems with 
intelligently chosen, attack resistant, defaults will help prevent overloading or deceiving 
the user, especially when combined with validated classical information visualization 
principles.  If after your analysis, you cannot protect against a given class of attack before 
it reaches the user, at least assist the user in detecting one has taken place (detecting 
“wrongness”). 
PROTECT THE DATA GENERATION AND DATA FLOW. 
An information visualization system is only as good as the data upon which it depends.  
Your ultimate goal is to improve data quality by increasing the good and reducing the 
bad, with emphasis on the most dangerous.   It does not take much bad data to cause 
significant damage.  In the network security domain, a single bad packet can provide root 
level access, waste hours of an operator’s time due to a false snort alert or hide an attack 
due to an auto-scaling algorithm. In most instances, information visualization systems 
operate in environments in which an adversary can insert malicious data.  Any source of 




machine producers and other trusted sources.  Your data should be protected by well-
validated techniques such as input and source validation and cryptography. 
     While it is beyond the scope of this chapter, designers should be aware of secure 
systems design best practices and threat modeling [101].  In particular, consider secure 
protocol development (confidentiality, authentication and integrity, in particular), 
appropriate use (and the limits) of cryptography, suitable security and usage policies, 
physical security, intrusion detection and input validation.  In high-risk applications, 
physically closing the system to outsiders (air gapping) and the use of virtual machines to 
separate data and processing into logical groupings may be in order. 
     Information visualization is a powerful tool for countering denial of information 
attacks, but systems must be designed to resist attack in order to be most effective.  We 
applied our principles for countering malicious visualizations as we designed and built 
our system as can be seen in the next chapter. 






RUMINT:  A SECURITY VISUALIZATION SYSTEM 
We addressed the problem of countering denial of information attacks by carefully 
crafting our visualization system to present data in insightful ways that tap into the high 
bandwidth visual recognition capability of human analysts.  We began our work by 
surveying professional security operators to determine the limits of today’s best systems 
and identify high payoff targets for improvement.  (See Chapter 6 for the complete 
results.) Using these requirements to drive our design we created the RUMINT 
visualization system.  While there is a wide range of potential security data sources, 
RUMINT is designed to provide detailed insights into packet level network traffic.  We 
have deployed RUMINT in a variety of laboratory and operational settings for a total of 
two years to evaluate its effectiveness.  During this period, we iteratively improved 
RUMINT’s design and developed a general framework for the design of security 
visualization systems.  In addition, we believe that the interactive, graphical techniques 
that we present will have broad application to other domains seeking to deal with 
problems of denial of information.   
A Design Framework for Security Visualization Systems 
In this section we propose a framework for the design of security visualization systems 
(Figure 5.1).  While system frameworks are difficult to validate categorically, our 
proposal emerged from several years of focused research. During this period, we 
iteratively designed and implemented six security visualization systems and conducted an 
extensive survey of commercial, open source and research systems.  From this review, we 




but were unable to find an underlying framework in the literature to inform our designs.  
We also noted that several systems advanced valuable, but rarely seen, components that 
we believe other researchers should consider.  Finally, we received feedback from users 
on several key areas that were lacking from any of today’s systems.   By merging insights 
from all of these sources we have attempted to create a comprehensive framework. We 
believe that by better defining the components and processing sequence of security 
visualization systems, other designers will more rapidly be able to design and construct 
effective systems.  In addition, by closely examining each individual component in 
isolation there lies great potential for future work and optimization.  We also believe that 
the lessons learned, which are embedded in the framework, will assist researchers 
working in other domains, particularly those constructing interactive information 
visualization systems.  The following sections describe the major components of the 
framework and illustrate its use by decomposing the Ethereal system.   It is important to 
note that not all components of the framework must be implemented for a successful 
 
Figure 5.1: Framework for the design of security visualization systems. Security data flows through a 
series of intermediate processing, encoding and filtering steps before being visualized.  After 






system, but we believe designers should, at least, consider each stage.   
 
inputs:  Possible inputs to the system may take many forms across a broad spectrum of 
data quality, from unprocessed data to highly refined semantic information.  For example, 
Snort performs signature matching against network traffic to provide specific alert 
information.  Ethereal collects only raw capture data from network packets.  Sources may 
include flows from security sensors, firewalls, intrusion detection systems, network 
servers, host-based security sub-systems and honeynets.  Inputs are not constrained to 
these, typically passive, traditional sources.  Additional semantic information may be 
infused into the visualization system by including active collection flows such as those 
provided by the nmap network mapping tool as well as more specialized tools, such as 
the p0f passive operating system fingerprinting tool.  Single streams of security flows are 
used in most implemented systems; effective integration of multiple streams to support 
improved correlation remains an open problem.  Timeliness of the data will range from 
real-time, near-real-time and historical information.  It may be collected directly by the 
visualization system, received from external devices or pulled from intermediate 
databases. 
 
preprocessing and pre-filtering:  The data and information flows received by the system 
may or may not be in a format compatible with the system.  In many instances they will 
need to be parsed and relevant information will need to be extracted.  Ethereal does this 
comprehensively through the use of dissectors for over 700 different protocols.   Pre-
filtering allows users to select only the desired subset of records/fields to progress further 




implements this capability through the use of a capture filtering language.   
 
system storage (RAM Cache & Disk Buffer):  After preprocessing and pre-filtering, the 
data may be buffered.  The buffer typically consists of a RAM cache and may include 
additional storage on disk for large data streams.  Ethereal behaves in this manner.  Such 
storage is optional and may be bypassed in instances where interactivity is at a minimum 
and state is not required.  
 
post filtering and encoding:  Filtering and encoding are logically intertwined.  Before 
being passed to the graphics engine and subsequent visualization, the user makes choices 
based on what information they would like to view and how to display it.  Ethereal uses a 
display filter language to filter data in the buffer and provides a coloring capability to 
encode additional information in the display. 
 
graphics engine and visualizations:  The graphics engine receives the remaining 
components of the data flows as well as encoding instructions and passes the information 
to the visualization displays.  The visualizations display the information using a variety of 
information visualization techniques and may include any number of semantic windows 
on the data.  Typically these visualizations are graphical in nature, but may exploit other 
senses such as sound and touch.  Ethereal provides a three pane multiple coordinated 
display which includes an interactive textual list, tree based protocol decodes and the raw 
hex/ASCII representation of the selected packet.  In the future, the graphics engine and 
visualization windows may include ties to machine processing modules to direct and 





logging and reporting:  Visual logging and reporting are relatively unexplored aspects of 
security visualization systems, but our interviews with security analysts indicated that 
they are quite important, particularly the reporting task, for communicating results to 
other analysts, end users, customers and managers.  Visual logging of security data 
includes automatically storing images and video clips of visualization activity in lieu of 
storing the underlying raw source data.  Visual reporting exploits the strengths of 
visualization systems by allowing the analyst to work through slices of network traffic 
and, once an area of interest is determined, allows easy construction of a summary report 
that may include marked-up images, video clips, filtering parameters and analyst 











Figure 5.2:  A panoramic view of the RUMINT packet visualization system.  Each window is 
designed to provide specialized insight into network traffic.  From left to right, the visualizations 
include:  (a) thumbnail overview toolbar,  (b) scrolling text display, (c) parallel coordinate plot of 
packet header fields, (d) detail view of packet contents, (e) glyph-based animation of network traffic, 




In order to best the design RUMINT to counter denial of information attacks we carefully 
considered the design principles we proposed during our threat analysis chapter:  educate 
the user, assume an intelligent and well informed adversary, design the system to protect 
the user and protect the data generation and data flow.   Of these we consider “design the 
system to protect the user” of primary importance.  Our key defense is inherent in the 
design of RUMINT.  We believe multiple semantic windows on network traffic will 
provide increased insight for the end user as well as an increased obstacle for a potential 
attacker.  As we described in the threat analysis chapter, there are a wide variety of 
attacks that can occur through a visualization system, but the vast majority target a 
specific visualization technique.  The key defense of RUMINT lies in its diverse range of 
visualizations.  Following closely behind designing the system to protect the user are 
“assume and intelligent and well informed adversary” and “protect the data generation 




provide little defense to the insertion of malicious traffic by intelligent adversaries.  
Beyond the diverse visualization defense we just described, we added filtering and 
encoding capabilities to allow the user to help remove noise and highlight activity of 
interest.  The final design principle “educate the user” is also quite important, but for 
purposes of the evaluation in the next chapter we chose users with a great deal of network 
security experience.  We believe that both these expert users and those with lesser 
experience will benefit from future work in the area of “smart books.”  Smart books 
consist of visual snapshots of both legitimate and malicious activity in order to enhance 
understanding and increase performance. 
     Beyond countering denial of information attacks, the primary design goal of RUMINT 
is to provide users the ability to view a large number of network packets in a way that 
supports rapid comparison, deep and broad semantic understanding, and highly efficient 
analysis.  At the same time, we wish to allow intuitive interaction in order to remove 
noise and highlight packets of interest.   It consists of a PVR interface and seven primary 
visualizations; each designed to provide different semantic windows on network traffic.  
These include: 
 
thumbnail toolbar (Figure 5.2a): The thumbnail toolbar provides a real-time overview of 
each visualization window in a thumbnail size display.  Doubling as a menu, users may 
bring up the full size window by clicking on a thumbnail. 
 
scrolling text display (Figure 5.2b):  The scrolling text display presents network packets, 
one per horizontal row,  in a user selectable encoding (ASCII, hexadecimal and decimal).  




on packet contents and display only sequences of characters from the printable ASCII 
range (e.g. strings of length 3-9). 
 
parallel coordinate plot display (Figure 5.2c):  This visualization uses the parallel 
coordinate plot technique to display scaled values from packet header fields.  Currently 
19 header fields, up to 19 vertical axes and 19! combinations of headers are supported.    
 
detail display (Figure 5.2d):  The detail window displays the selected packet’s contents in 
a traditional hex/ASCII format. 
 
glyph-based animation display (Figure 5.2e):  The glyph-based display combines three 
display panes to animate any two attributes (header fields) of network traffic.  The center 
pane is a two axis parallel coordinate plot and the side panes contain glyphs which move 
off the screen as the network traffic is processed. 
  
binary rainfall visualization (Figure 5.2f): The binary rainfall visualization displays 
packet contents, one per line.  It has three primary views which map packet contents to 
display pixels. 
 
scatterplot display (Figure 5.2g):  The scatter plot visualization allows users to select any 
two header fields (19 are implemented) and plots them on a traditional X,Y display.  
Header field values are scaled to match the dimensions of the display window. 
 




presence and frequency of bytes within each packet.   
 
PVR interface (Figure 5.2h): The PVR interface is the heart of the RUMINT application.  
Packets are captured live from the network or loaded from capture files and stored in an 
internal cache.  The PVR interface allows playback of these packets for viewing in any of 
the visualization windows.  This approach extends the VCR metaphor suggested by 
Erbacher [32].   
 
From the near infinite space of possible visualization techniques these seven were chosen 
based on both intuition and feedback from security analysts.  During the design process 
we explored approximately 15 other visualizations, but these were ultimately discarded 
because they did not most effectively address user needs.  We believe these seven 
visualizations represent a solid set of techniques that can be refined to increase their 
utility, but it is important to note that the PVR based design of the system scales well.  It 







Figure 5.3:  The PVR interface is the heart of the RUMINT system.  It allows the user to play back 
traffic from any point in the dataset.   
 
Interaction Paradigm 
The PVR (Figure 5.3) is the heart of the RUMINT system and is the primary interface 
presented to the user.  From the view menu on the PVR users may select any of the 
visualization windows to display playback results.  When performing live capture, the 
captured packets are stored in a RAM buffer and immediately displayed.  Playback may 
be paused to allow closer inspection of previous network traffic and resumed without 
interruption.  The horizontal scrollbar allows the user to select a single packet for display 
and the << and >> buttons step forward and backward through the traffic.  Playback 
speed is adjustable, using controls on the PVR, from one packet per second to a 
theoretical limit of 1,000 packets per second.  If the underlying system hardware is 
unable to reach this limit, packets are played back at the fastest possible speed.  In 
addition, the interface includes buttons to continuously loop through the dataset, clear all 




filtering control panel (Figure 5.4) to filter traffic before it is displayed as well select 
color encoding.  The figure shows two iterations of the filtering and encoding control 
panel.  The initial iteration (Figure 5.4, top) explored the use of custom filters, created by 
analysts, to interactively remove slices of network traffic from the display.  While we 
believe this is a very valuable approach, we chose to create flexible, general-purpose 
filters based on packet headers (Figure 5.4, bottom).  Ultimately, we believe the best 
solution may be to allow users to create filters using a general purpose graphical user 
interface and via the Ethereal’s textual filtering language.  These filters could then be 
saved for future use.  Further exploration of this topic is a valuable area for future work. 
 
After the user has decided to play back traffic, they can call up the desired visualization 
window via the view menu on the PVR interface.  While this approach is functional at the 
current level of visualization options, it does not scale well.  We designed the thumbnail 
menu, shown in Figure 5.5 in order to counter this problem.  The thumbnail menu 
contains small-scale display windows that allows the user to see all visualization displays 
at one time.  Whereas a single visualization window may occupy up to the full screen at a 
given time, the thumbnail menu can display approximately eighty.  By observing 
playback on the menu users can then click on a given thumbnail display to bring up the 
full scale visualization window.  While observing a large number of thumbnail views at 
one time may present at problem as additional visualizations are added, we believe it is 





















Figure 5.4:  Interactive Filtering and Encoding Control Panel.  Initial design (top) and revised design 
(bottom).  This panel exploits the fact that filtering and encoding are logically intertwined.  It allows 











Figure 5.5:  Two variants of the thumbnail visualization menu. Initial design (left) and  





System Architecture and Implementation 
The RUMINT system was developed based upon the framework presented earlier in the 
chapter.  While previous components were implemented using Perl and C, the current 
iteration was developed using Microsoft Visual Studio, primarily for its strength in rapid 
GUI development. Our plan was to exploit the strength of GUI development under 
Windows and port the software to a more robust Open GL / QT application in the 
Linux/Unix environment after the user interface and visualization design has been 
finalized.  The primary test bed system was an AMD 2500+ with 1GB of RAM, 64MB of 
Video RAM, 10/100 network card and 160GB hard drive running Windows XP.       
     RUMINT captures packets live from the network using the winpcap library for kernel 
level capture and the PacketX [12] ActiveX component for easy access to network data 
from Visual Studio applications.  While this proved straightforward for live capture, 
PacketX unfortunately does not support pcap file access.    This proved problematic and 
we ultimately resorted to implementing a custom pcap file parser directly in RUMINT.  
     When the packet data is loaded from a file or captured from the network interface it is 
parsed and stored in a RAM buffer.   The user interacts with the encoding, filtering and 
zoom menus to select the parameters of interest.  The system then queries the RAM 
buffer for the appropriate packets and submits the data to the graphics engine.  The 
graphics engine updates currently active visualization windows.  The following section 







Figure 5.6:  Binary Rainfall Visualization of Defcon 11 “Capture the Flag” Network Traffic.  One 
packet is plotted per horizontal line.  In this level of zoom, each pixel represents one bit of network 
traffic.   Network layer protocol headers are encoded in orange and the encapsulated IP payload is 
encoded in green.  This visualization allows analysts to readily compare approximately 600-1000+ 
packets per screen. 
 
 
Figure 5.7:  Binary Rainfall Visualization Design.  The bits of each packet are plotted horizontally.  
Each new packet is plotted on a horizontal line below the previous packet.  The semantic zoom menu 








(a) 1 bit per pixel view 
 
 












(c) 1 byte per pixel view (d) 1 byte per pixel view, with 0x90 bytes encoded in red and 
printable ASCII values encoded in blue 
 
Figure 5.8:  Binary Rainfall Visualization Method.  Images (a), (b) and (c) depict three graphical zoom levels.  Image (d) 




Visualization Design  
Binary Rainfall Visualization 
The binary rainfall visualization (Figures 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8) was inspired by the 
classic waterfall display used for spectrum analysis but instead plots binary objects, one 
per horizontal line, in time sequence order.  It is useful for a variety of tasks, including 
comparing the payloads (to include identifying the use of encryption), lengths and 
headers of packets.  When properly color encoded it is useful to locate human readable 
(i.e. printable ASCII) traffic and shows promise for detecting buffer overflow activity.  
The user interacts with the display using the semantic zoom menu.  We tried placement 
of this menu in two different ways.  Our initial approach was on the right portion of the 
window (Figure 5.6), but we later moved it to a drop down box as seen in Figure 5.8 and 
added the ability to change levels by double clicking the display.  We believe our more 
recent approach is more efficient in that it allows more screen space for the visualization, 
but are aware that it comes at a slight usability cost due to slightly hidden functionality.  
While conceptually this menu will allow a wide variety of views of the data objects, we 
implemented seven, four graphical and three textual.  The graphical views plot pixels in 
direct correspondence to the structure of the binary data.  These four views include 
plotting each bit of binary data as a monochrome pixel (Figure 5.8a), each byte of binary 
data as a 256 level green pixel (Figure 5.8c), each three bytes of binary data as 24-bit 
RGB pixel (Figure 5.8b) as well as a rainfall representation of byte frequency (Figure 
5.9).  The fourth graphical visualization, the byte frequency view, plots one packet per 
horizontal line.  Pixels along the horizontal axis, scaled from 0-255, are illuminated based 




The pixel may be illuminated as a single color if one or more of a given byte is present 
(byte presence) or encoded with color based upon the frequency (byte frequency).  The 
textual views allowed the user to view the same objects as ASCII, hexadecimal and 
decimal representations and will be discussed later in the chapter.  We provide each of 
these views to allow the user to visualize network traffic as needed for their current tasks.  
As we described in earlier, current techniques for analyzing network payload data rely 
almost exclusively on textual representations.  By combining textual header and payload 
visualization with graphical techniques, we gain a significant increase in the amount of 
data that can be displayed on the screen at one time.  Table 5.1 shows the increase, in 
various graphical modes, when compared to ASCII and Hex representations.   This 
comparison is based on the amount screen space required to display an equivalent 
number of bits of information. 
 
Table 5.1: Comparison of graphical vs. textual  information density. 
Graphical ASCII Hex 
1 bit per pixel 15x 45x 
8 bits per pixel 120x 360x 
16 bits per pixel 240x 720x 
24 bits per pixel 360x 1080x  





     While the binary rainfall technique is generally applicable to many types of binary 
objects, we applied the visualization technique to network packets in order to test its 
effectiveness.  A key criterion is that network packets are highly structured and small 
enough, typically less than 1518 bytes, to be effectively displayed and compared using 
our graphical modes.  We augmented the visualization technique with mouse over 



























Figure 5.9:  Detail of Byte Frequency View:  The byte frequency view is one of the semantic levels 
available to the user.  Bytes (0-255) are plotted along the horizontal axis.  As each packet is plotted, 
pixels are illuminated according to the frequency of that byte relative to each packet.  The left figure 
shows the byte presence design and the right figure shows the byte frequency of network traffic from 








Figure 5.10:  RUMINT’s Parallel Coordinate Plot Visualization Display.  This figure is currently set 
to display eight of the possible 19 vertical axes. 
 
Parallel Coordinate Plot 
The parallel coordinate plot visualization technique is a well-known tool in use by the 
general information visualization community.  We included it in RUMINT because of its 
ability to effectively display a large number of variables at one time.  When coupled with 
the PVR engine and the other visualization windows it is particularly useful for rapidly 
characterizing the header fields of packets from large datasets.  The current 
implementation (Figure 5.10) allows the user to interactively set the number of vertical 
axes as well as independently assign any of 19 header fields to each axis for a total of 19! 




alternative combinations of header field to axis mappings.  This visualization technique 
while generally effective, suffers from several shortcomings.  Occlusion occurs when line 
segments and labels are rendered on top of each other.  In addition, the graphics library 
we used (Win32) did not allow us to efficiently implement the ability of a user to click on 

















Glyph-based Animated Display 
The glyph-based animated display  (Figures 5.11 and 5.12) combines a two column 
parallel coordinate plot with glyph-based animation.  Similar to our general-purpose 
parallel coordinate plot visualization, the glyph-based parallel coordinate plot axes can be 
mapped to any of 19 header fields.  The glyph-based approach augments the parallel 
coordinate plot by creating two animated pixels for each arriving packet.   These pixels 
slide outward across the screen as additional packets arrive.  Their vertical position is 
determined by the end points of the line segment connecting the two parallel coordinate 
plot axes.  We found this technique useful in combination with RUMINT’s other parallel 
coordinate plot visualization to help cope with issues of occlusion.  The creation and 
movement of the glyphs allows the user to observe the precise arrival sequence of 
hundreds of packets despite occlusion of the parallel coordinate plot line segments.  
When we prototyped this visualization we created it to support both 2D and 3D using the 
Open GL graphics library.  The primary difference between the 2D and 3D views was the 
mapping of packet length to the Z axis in the 3D display (Figure 5.11).  After prototyping 
the initial application we integrated it into RUMINT as a 2D display only (Figure 5.12), 








Figure 5.13:  Example of Scatter Plot Display. 
 
Scatter Plot Visualization 
In order to provide a comprehensive set of tools to the user we included a traditional 2D 
scatter plot display.  Similar to the parallel coordinate plot, it allows users to map any of 
the 19 header fields to the horizontal and vertical axes.  While generally useful it would 
be strengthened by adding zoom functionality, using techniques to counter labeling 







Figure 5.14:  RUMINT’s Detail View Pane 
 
Packet Detail and Text Rainfall Views 
Both of these techniques perform the critical role of providing packet level detail to users.  
The detail view window (Figure 5.14) uses the canonical hex/ASCII representation 
commonly accepted as a best practice in packet level analysis.  With the addition of the 
PVR interface’s horizontal scroll bar, we have increased its utility by allowing users to 
rapidly jump to and view any packet in the dataset.  A complement to both the packet 
detail and binary rainfall views, the text rainfall view allows users to observe and directly 







(a) ASCII representation 
 
(b) ASCII representation filtered for printable ASCII 
strings of length 6 or more 
 
 
(c) Decimal represtation 
 
(d) Hexadecimal representation 
 
 
Figure 5.15:  Text Rainfall Visualization.  The Text Rainfall Visualization provides three primary representations of the 






    a.  ASCII text file retrieved via HTTP                               b.  ASCII text file byte frequency 
  
c.  SSH traffic                                                                            d.  SSH traffic byte frequency 
 
 
Figure 5.16:  Comparison of ASCII (a & b) and SSH (c & d) network traffic.   The binary rainfall 
images (left column) provide a quick overview of packet structure. Headers and packet lengths are 
readily apparent.  The byte frequency images (right column) clearly show the difference between 
printable ASCII content (b) and encrypted content (d).  Solid vertical lines indicate reoccurring values 
such as constant header fields.  Diagonal lines indicate incrementally changing values, such as 
sequence numbers. 
 
Example Usage and Additional Analysis 
To test the efficacy of RUMINT we used it in a wide variety of scenarios, both 
operational and experimental, with real-time packet capture and with forensic packet 




Characterization of Basic Network Protocols and Coping with Messenger Spam  
     
Our initial experiments consisted of testing the system with legitimate SMTP, HTTP, 
Telnet, SSH, VoIP, FTP and SSL traffic.  These tests allowed us to characterize what 
“normal” traffic looks like (Figure 5.16).    We then used the system to visualize a variety 
of common attack tools in order to create additional visual fingerprints. After conducting 
this background work, we examined a variety of malicious and non-malicious network 
traffic from forensic datasets including those from the DEFCON Capture the Flag 
competition, the United States Military Academy CyberDefense Exercise and the 
Honeynet Project as well as datasets collected from a Botnet sinkhole created at Georgia 
Tech.   
     Operationally, we used the system to monitor Georgia Tech Honeynet traffic for ten 
months, from July 2004 to April 2005.   In a typical usage scenario, users loaded datasets 
of interest and iteratively adjusted the menu parameters to focus on areas of interest.  For 
example, a user examining a honeynet dataset wished to filter as much Internet 
background radiation [85] as possible.  Being familiar with Pang’s observation that a 
portion of UDP traffic is caused by messenger spam, the user wished to constrain the 
visualization to display only UDP traffic from common messenger ports then confirm 
that the traffic was indeed messenger spam and finally to filter those packets.  The user 
first viewed the entire data set and noted that a portion of the traffic contained groups of 
nearly identical packets (Figure 5.17a) with a high percentage of bytes in the printable 
ASCII range (Figure 5.17b).  The user examined the payloads of these packets and 




traffic as messenger spam (Figure 5.17d) and created a filter for use with future datasets 
(the filter can be seen in Figure 5.4, top).  We found that our test subjects liked the notion 
of working through slices of the traffic and then removing them from the dataset.  By 
iteratively removing noise from the display, this approach takes maximum advantage of 
the high-bandwidth visual recognition capability of human analysts and allows them to 






   a.  View of Georgia Tech honeynet traffic (with headers)       b.  Byte frequency of Georgia Tech honeynet traffic 
 
  
   c. Filtering all traffic, but UDP ports 1026 and 1027            d. Closer examination confirms traffic is Messenger Spam 
 
 
Figure 5.17:  Use of the System to Rapidly Identify and Filter Traffic.  An analyst views a day’s capture from the 
Georgia Tech Honeynet (a) and examines the byte frequency of the packets (b).   Several sets of packets have a large 
number of bytes in the printable ASCII range.  By using the interaction menus, the analyst examines the payloads of 
these packets and verifies their similarity (c).  Using the semantic zoom capability, the analyst confirms the traffic as 





     This scenario relied heavily on the Binary Rainfall visualization. We were pleased 
with its overall design.    Its primary strength is the lack of abstraction, making it ideal for 
low-level analysis of network packets and other binary objects.  The byte frequency 
display augments the bit and byte level graphical views and provides insight into the 
nature of the traffic.  We found it most useful to rapidly classify traffic as human 
readable, machine readable or encrypted.  Both techniques effectively allowed over 1,000 
network packets to be viewed at a very detailed level and easily compared.  The exact 
number of objects that can be displayed approaches the vertical resolution of the user’s 
monitor.  This upper limit proved to be sufficient when combined with zooming and 
filtering, but we envision the need to allow the user to page, or scroll, through multiple 
screens of content rather than the confine them to the single view window that our current 
system provides.  While the system succeeded in visualizing a large number of objects, 
the rainfall visualization is limited to displaying approximately 1000 bits (1 bit / pixel 
mode), 1000 bytes (8 bits / pixel mode) and 3000 bytes (24 bits / pixel mode) of each 
packet at any given time.  In some instances this might prove to be an obstacle, but in the 
case of network packets it was successful, particularly when compared with a pure 
ASCII/Hex text display.  Ethernet frames are limited to 1518 bytes which is well within 
the display parameters of the system.  In future implementations we will also consider the 
addition of a traditional, i.e. non-semantic, zoom capability to allow far more of the data 
to be displayed.  It is important to note that test users found the 1 bit and 8 bits per pixel 
modes most effective.  The 24 bit mode proved useful for comparing packet length, but 
little else.  In future work we plan to test combined modes that use a higher resolution (1 
bit and 8 bits per pixel mode) display for header data and lower resolution (8 and 24 bits 




     While the visualization provides high information density it comes at the cost of lost 
timing data.  Packets are visualized as they arrive, which results in an information rich 
display that is useful for comparing packets.  Spacing packets based on time of arrival is 
easily possible, but would create a sparsely populated display that we believe would 
hinder analysis. 
     It is also important to consider the security of graphical binary rainfall screenshots.  
Because the graphical modes represent large amounts of actual network traffic, to include 
payloads, it would be straightforward for an attacker to extract this information by 
creating an application which examines pixels.  The same amount of care should be taken 
with these images as when sharing network capture files.  In future work we will consider 
creating anonymization tools for the images similar to tcpdpriv and ipsumdump.  We also 
believe that many classes of information visualization tools, including our system, are 
subject to overt and covert manipulation by malicious entities who inject carefully crafted 
traffic into the network (see Chapter 4). 
     Effective interaction is key to the value of the system.  While the binary rainfall 
visualization technique allows users to compare 600-1000+ binary objects and detect 
general patterns, anomalies and outliers, it is most effective when combined with 
dynamic queries, semantic zoom and interactive encoding.    Our users used these 
capabilities to focus on areas on interest, but an unpredicted filtering issue emerged.  Our 
system design failed to take into account the user’s need to toggle between a filtered 
range and its inverse.  Users desired this capability to examine certain classes of traffic 
and then remove that slice of data from view.  Essentially, what was required was the 
ability to invert each filter.  While we were able to hard code this capability in select 




can build and share these filters (perhaps with analyst comments).  Each filter would have 
three states:  off, on (band pass) and on (inverted band pass).   
      System performance was acceptable up to 100,000 packets, but was sluggish beyond 
this level.  There were two primary reasons:  slow graphics operations and inefficient 
data structures to buffer packet data.  We were not surprised by these limitations.  The 
strength of Visual Studio lies not in efficient graphics operations and pointer-based data 
structures, but in rapid GUI development.  In the future, we believe we can achieve an 






Visual Fingerprinting of Network Attack Tools Using the Parallel Coordinate Plot 
 
Beyond the characterization of typical network protocols, we examined the fingerprints 
left by common network attack tools.  For this work, our experiments were conducted in 
a networking laboratory and we gathered data using the following scenarios:  baseline 
“normal” traffic, attacks using single tools without extraneous traffic and attacks using 
single tools with typical traffic.  Our intent was to test how well our candidate 
visualization techniques performed with and without the noise of routine traffic.  We plan 
further experiments that test less aggressive tools and multiple tools in parallel with and 
without routine traffic.   
     The system and visualization suite was tested with a range of popular network attack 
tools falling into two broad categories:  network reconnaissance and vulnerability 
assessment. The network reconnaissance class of tools typically allow ping sweeps, 
TCP/UDP port scans and operating systems detection. Many high quality tools of this 
class are freely available and widely used by attackers.  Network assessment tools probe 
target machines for unknown vulnerabilities.  To test the efficacy of our approach we 
utilized the tools and host operating systems listed in Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2:  Attack Tools Tested 
Tool Attacker OS 
nmap 3.0 Windows XP, Redhat 8 
nmap 3.5 Windows XP 
nmapwin 1.3.1 Windows XP 
Superscan 3.0 Windows XP 
Superscan 4.0 Windows XP 
scanline 1.01 Windows XP 
nessus 2.0.10 Redhat 8 
nikto 1.32 Windows XP 







     To varying degrees, all the visualizations we tested proved effective in analyzing and 
fingerprinting attack tools.  In particular, the port-to-port parallel plot view proved to be 
of significant value.  The images in Figure 5.18 dramatically show the differences and 
similarities between several tools run from both Linux and Windows XP operating 
systems.  UDP traffic is in orange and TCP traffic is in green.  Each fingerprint can be 
reliably reproduced with each subsequent use of the tool with only slight variations in the 
location of the attacker’s source ports.  The default target ports remain the same.  Some 
 




may argue that these tools are flexible and alternate ports may be chosen by the attacker.  
In addition, some tools have publicly available source code and an attacker could create a 
heavily modified application and thus alter the fingerprint.  This is true, but naive use of 
default settings would indicate that the attacker might be of limited experience. In 
addition, some tools do not have publicly available source code and are not easily 
modifiable. Another insight is that by knowing the attack tool in use, the network 
administrator can take appropriate action.  For example, if your web server was probed 
using the nikto vulnerability assessment tool (figure 5.18) the system administrator might 
wish to do the same in order to be certain that the tool did not report any vulnerabilities.   
 
  
scanline 1.01  
 
  Superscan 4.0 
 
 
Figure 5.19:  Comparison of the network behavior of scanline 1.01 and Superscan 4.0.  Similar network 
behavior may indicate code lineage.  Both pictures are of a parallel coordinate plot depicting the external 









Figure 5.20:  In-Depth Look at Common nmap Options 
 
     The external port/IP to internal IP/port coordinate plot views in Figure 5.20 compare 
common modes of nmap 3.0.  The respective mode and command line switch is listed 
underneath each image.  After studying these images we noted several things.  This view 
is useful for normalizing the characteristic nmap fan because all attacks against the same 
IP address show the base of the fan at the same point.  Stealthy attacks that take 
advantage of weaknesses in the TCP protocol, such as the SYN scan, still need to send 
packets across the network and the signature is still visible.  While it is still possible to 
take advantage of different implementations of the TCP/IP stack to perform evasion or 
insertion attacks, the visualizations above show that some classes of stealth techniques 




through as well.  If you consider the range of source ports used by each mode you will 
see that there is a difference.  Nmap typically relies on raw sockets allowing the 
application to control virtually every aspect of packet construction.  The CONNECT scan 
shows a wide range of source ports in use that we suspect is due to reliance upon the 
connect system call.  The ability to predict operating system source ports was recently 
proven to be a critical component of TCP reset attacks.  A weakness of the visualization 
is the inability to detect subtle differences between most of the scans.  The FIN, NULL, 
XMAS, SYN and SYN with operating system fingerprinting all appear the same.  In 
future work we plan to develop visualizations that show the flags in use by TCP packets 
as we believe that this will show an attacker’s operating system fingerprinting attempts.  
Reliance upon the same code base may also be evident in some cases.  This evidence 
might prove useful with such tasks as quickly estimating if two malicious software 
applications were created by the same person or same malware toolkit.  Figure 5.19 (left) 
shows the scanline 1.01 tool and Figure 5.19 (right) shows Superscan 4.0.  Both tools 
were provided by the same company with scanline being made available some time 
before Superscan.  The port scanning fans are virtually identical, but the source port fan 
is dramatically different.  We suspect that Superscan was developed from the same base 
source code, but with the addition of multithreading.  We are unable to confirm this, as 




Examining Campus Backbone and Honeynet Traffic Using the  
Glyph-based Animated Display 
Backbone Traffic 
Visualization of enterprise level networks is an active area of research.  While we have 
been focusing primarily on packet level analysis, we tested the glyph-based animated 
display with traffic captured on the Georgia Tech campus network.  This network 
supports 2.5 class B address spaces, approximately 30,000 active computers and has an 
average throughput of 600 Mbps to the Internet.   Figures 5.21, 5.22 and 5.23 show 
results from our experimentation:  inbound campus backbone traffic (5 second snapshot), 
outbound campus backbone traffic (5 second snapshot) and inbound campus network 
traffic (10 millisecond snapshot).  In analyzing the images, we believe we have generally 
exceeded the capability of the animated technique.  Creating and animating two glyphs 
for every network packet is extremely resource intensive and exceeds the capability of 
desktop workstations at this level of network activity.  In addition, scaling the network 
address spaces and ports down to screen resolution caused a great deal of occlusion.  
Despite these shortcomings, our experimentation did produce some insights.  By 
examining the 5 second captures in Figure 5.21 vertical striations are evident.  We 
believe these were caused by the inability of our commercial network sensor to capture 
packets at this speed.   Also evident from the images and from our observation of the 
animated playback is the general relationship between the ports in use.  For example, 
Figure 5.21 shows a great deal of inbound traffic arriving at low port numbers, indicative 







Figure 5.21: Inbound Campus Backbone Traffic (5 sec) The left vertical axis depicts IP address on 





Figure 5.22: Inbound Campus Backbone Traffic (10 msec).  The left vertical axis depicts IP addresses 





Figure 5.23: Outbound Campus Backbone Traffic (5 sec).  The left vertical axis depicts source IP and 





A honeynet is a network of honeypots, machines that are intended to be compromised, 
designed to provide the system administrator with intelligence about vulnerabilities and 
compromises within the network. A honeynet is placed behind a reverse firewall that 
captures all inbound and outbound data.  The reverse firewall limits the amount of 
malicious traffic that can leave the honeynet.  This data is surreptitiously contained, 
captured, and controlled.  Any type of network device can be placed within the honeynet, 
to include configurations identical to production machines elsewhere on the network.  
These standard production systems are used on the honeynet in order to give an attacker 
the enticing look and feel of a real system.  Since honeypots do not offer any legitimate 
services to Internet users and the Internet addresses of the honeypots are not publicly 
known, most traffic on the honeynet is suspicious.  These qualities result in an unusually 
high signal to noise ratio.  We exploited this capability to test the effectiveness of our 
approach by applying the glyph-based visualization to a variety of archival honeynet 
capture files.  As an example, on January 25, 2003 the Slammer worm hit the Internet and 
our campus network. Slammer targeted Microsoft SQL Servers and machines running the 
Microsoft SQL Server Desktop Engine. The worm sent out its exploit code in 404-byte 
UDP packets to port 1434. Figure 5.24 shows 640 seconds of this traffic. Clearly visible 
are many identically sized UDP packets (blue) targeting a single port. As another 
example, on February 22, 2004, a computer on campus compromised one of the 
honeypots.  Honeynet traffic jumped from 1.5 MB on February 21 to 4.5 MB on February 
22 and back down to 0.5 MB on February 23.  It took several days of manually studying 




using the visualization system, the compromise traffic is easily observed; the timestamp 
in the display directs the analyst to the exact point in the capture log to begin detailed 
analysis. The left IP plane shows that all traffic occurs inside the Georgia Tech address 
range. This significantly reduces the time required to conduct forensic analysis. This 
reduction in effort is a key benefit of using our visualization system.  Security analysts 
are faced with a tremendous amount of security logs and our system allows them to 
rapidly identify regions of interest.  A network administrator using this tool could also 
























































HUMAN-CENTRIC EVALUATION OF RUMINT 
 
Security visualization is a relatively new area and while initial results bear great promise, 
there has been a noticeable lack of human-centric evaluation to determine its true 
effectiveness.  We argue that human-centric evaluation is of critical importance in 
determining the effectiveness of visualization solutions to denial of information 
problems.  By definition, security visualization systems rely upon the perceptual system 
of humans.  They are designed to help solve human tasks.  Without including a human-
centric evaluation, based on user requirements, a key component is missing.  
Unfortunately, evaluating humans is messy, time consuming and difficult.  Humans do 
not provide clean results and it takes large numbers of participants to produce statistical 
significance.  Where in traditional system analysis thousands of iterations of an algorithm 
may be run over a weekend to rapidly converge on meaningful results, we do not have 
that option.  We have to convince test subjects to voluntarily participate. Each hour they 
spend is an hour they lose for other activities they wish to pursue.  In short, human 
evaluation does not scale. At most research facilities we must comply with strict human 
subject study requirements overseen by institutional review boards. All organizers must 
undergo formal certification in human subject experimentation before they can begin 
work on a specific project.  Initial approval typically takes weeks or months.  Each 
change in the study protocol requires re-approval. Instead of a simple change to a 
program and immediately rerunning of tests, our evaluation cycle takes several orders of 




sets:  a deep understanding of the security problem and a thorough knowledge of human 
evaluation techniques.  Despite these challenges, we must seek acceptable evaluation of 
our security visualization systems.   
     To be most accurate, security visualization evaluation requires two key components: 
real-world user requirements and an evaluation using subjects as close as possible to real-
world users.  The linkage between these two components then allows for an evaluation to 
determine how well these requirements have been met.  The goal of this paper is to 
explore these two facets by presenting results and lessons learned from the requirements 
generation phase of a security visualization system design and from two subsequent 
quantitative evaluations.  We address the problem of security analyst information 
overload and evaluate the performance of the RUMINT packet visualization system [90] 
in meeting user requirements.  Our user attitude and needs assessment survey explored 
the limitations of two widely employed network analysis tools: the Snort intrusion 
detection system and the Ethereal packet level protocol analyzer.  Specifically we sought 
expert level insight into the following questions: 
 
• What is the difficulty of inserting malicious data into security related 
datasets in three contexts:  intrusion detection alerts, network packets and 
system logs? 
• Given some degree of malicious data, how difficult is it to mislead or 
confuse the human when using  Snort and Ethereal? 
• What is the threshold at which Snort and Ethereal become difficult to use?  
Specifically, we sought to quantify the threshold at which these tools 




issues such as graphical frame rate and CPU utilization, only the cognitive 
burden placed on the human. 
• What are the general strengths and weaknesses of these two tools? 
 
     From these requirements, we designed two quantitative experiments to evaluate 
human performance using  RUMINT.  We focused specifically on packet level analysis 
and did not address intrusion detection alerts and system logs.  We sought to answer the 
following questions: 
 
• Can humans visually detect malicious activity in the playback of forensic 
network traffic?  
• How precisely were analysts able to locate malicious anomalies within the 
dataset? 
• How long does it take an analyst to detect and precisely locate malicious 
activity? 
• What classes of malicious activity were most easily detectable? 
• How much task specific training and analyst experience is required to 
accomplish these tasks? 
• During the course of using the tool, how rapidly does human performance 
improve? 
 
     Instead of being weighted toward students, our requirements study was weighted 
heavily toward professional security analysts who were recruited during the Black Hat 




experiments were hands on and included 10 Master of Science in Information Security 
Students and 22 upper level Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering students.  Both 
experiments were conducted at a large research university.  During the course of our 
analysis we provide lessons learned to help support other researchers as they seek out 
operator requirements and design human-centric evaluations of their systems.  We do not 
discuss the design and implementation itself, as these issues have already been addressed 
in Chapter 5.   
     The primary contributions of this chapter include our survey of expert user attitudes 
regarding the strengths and weaknesses of two common analysis tools Ethereal and Snort, 
the vulnerability of intrusion detection systems, the Unix-style system logging service 
(syslog) and network packet captures to the insertion of malicious data and an 
examination of the human-centric threshold at which analysts become overwhelmed 
when using these tools.  Our contributions also include results, analysis and lessons 
learned from two quantitative experiments that test the ability of intermediate and 
advanced users to both detect and precisely locate security anomalies in network traffic. 
 
User Requirements and Attitude Survey 
 
Our user requirements survey was designed to elicit feedback from experienced security 
practitioners in order to guide the design of our prototype visualization system. We 
primarily recruited participants at the Black Hat USA 2005 and DEFCON 13 computer 
security conferences.  We chose these venues due to the high percentage of experienced 




from industry/government and 14 from academia.  Members of the industry group were 
64% professional security analysts, the remainder were in related fields (system 
administration, network security assessment, software testing) with significant security 
responsibilities.   All participants from academia specialized in computer security.   
     We asked survey participants to rate their background and knowledge level in 
computer security.  We were pleased with the results.  Most reported a significant 
background in computer security.  On a scale from 1 (other than security) to 6 
(exclusively security), the average was 4.846, with a standard deviation of 1.136.  
Likewise, the group reported a computer security knowledge level of 4.743, with a 
standard deviation of 1.093, on a scale of 1 (novice) to 6 (expert).  Based on our 
interactions with the participants and their self-reported skill assessment we believe we 
met our goal of surveying experienced security analysts. 
 
Vulnerability to Malicious Data 
The core of the survey included three main sections.  The first section sought to 
determine security analyst attitudes regarding the likelihood that security visualization 
systems would be targets of attack as well as to assess the vulnerability of several key 
security data sources upon which these systems depend:  system logging, intrusion 







As shown in Table 6.1, respondents felt overwhelmingly that attackers can insert 
malicious data into three data sources including from remote locations across a network.  
We concur with their assessment.  The ability to insert malicious data is a vulnerability 
that enables attackers to target both automated security processing systems, such as 
intrusion detection systems, as well as the humans utilizing these systems.   We are 
concerned particularly with the human-centric aspect because it is directly applicable to 
DoI attacks that seek to mislead or overwhelm human analysts.  An excellent example is 
the use of malicious network packets to trigger arbitrary alerts from the Snort intrusion 
detection system.  Just a small number of carefully chosen alerts can consume the limited 
resources of individuals charged with monitoring intrusion detection systems and 
defending the network.  Our security visualization system, which we evaluate later in this 
chapter, is designed to help counter packet-level attacks by providing analysts new tools 
to interpret and analyze data, effectively increasing the difficulty for a malicious entity 
seeking to achieve a successful Denial of Information attack.  We are less certain of the 
validity of the final two questions listed in Table 6.1.  We sought to determine if security 
experts believed information visualization systems would be considered a high priority 
target for attack.  While the survey results indicated the respondents believed they would 
be used for critical applications and likely targets for attack, informal discussions in the 
Table 6.1:  Ability of Attackers to Inject Malicious Data into pcap, syslog and Snort Datasets 
Question Scale Average Standard Deviation 
Attackers can insert malicious data into packet 
captures 
1 = No  
6 = Absolutely 
5.263 1.032 
Attackers can insert malicious data into system 
logs remotely (across a network) 
1 = No  
6 = Absolutely 
4.842 1.462 
Attackers can insert malicious data into system 
logs from a local user account 
1 = No  
6 = Absolutely 
5.184 1.136 
Attackers can remotely (across a network) trigger 
desired intrusion detection system alerts 
1 = No  
6 = Absolutely 
5.436 1.071 
Information visualization systems can best be 
used for critical or non-critical applications 
1 = Non-Critical Applications 
6 = Critical Applications 
4.789 1.044 
Information visualization systems are likely 
targets for attack 
1 = No  





course of conducting the survey indicated that there was some confusion and we consider 
our results inconclusive.  We believe these questions to be important and will more 
precisely word them in the future. 
Analyst Overload 
The second section of the survey asked the participants to estimate the point at which 
they, and not their given computing platform, became overwhelmed when using Ethereal 
and Snort.  To prevent confusion, the survey included specific instructions that clearly 
asked participants to consider only human, and not machine, performance.  The results 
are shown in Figure 6.1.  The figure shows that both professionals and students have a 
distinct tipping point when they become overwhelmed with security data.  We did 
exclude two outliers from our Ethereal results.  These values, one million packets and one 
hundred thousand packets, are shown in the figure, but were removed in our statistics 
below.  Using Ethereal students became overwhelmed when faced with datasets 
containing an average of 635 packets for students (n=7) and professionals became 
overwhelmed with 5,905 packets (n=18).   While these statistics are based on self-
reported data, we believe it is a reasonable assumption that information security students 
and, in particular, professional security practitioners, would be able to estimate this value.  
When comparing the averages for both groups it is important to note that professionals 
reported overload at approximately an order of magnitude higher than students.    Figure 
6.1b illustrates a similar tipping point for Snort alerts.  When asked how many Snort 
alerts they could handle per hour, students reported reaching overload at an average of 30 
(n=6, standard deviation = 35.70) and professionals were able to handle an average of 





reported a significant improvement over students.  Based on informal discussions with 
 
 
(a) Ethereal overload 
 
(b) Snort overload 
 
 





the professional group, we believe the primary reason was an intimate knowledge of the 
networks under their care as well as their use of reporting tools, backend databases and 
custom processing scripts.  The remaining questions in this section of the survey sought 
to clarify how easily attackers could worsen these tipping points by the insertion of 
malicious data designed to overwhelm or mislead analysts.  These questions are related 
to, but distinct from, those shown in Table 6.1.   
 
Figure  6.2: Ability to confuse and mislead Snort and Ethereal users 
      
     The results in Table 6.1, show how difficult it would be for an attacker to insert 
malicious data into security related datasets.  These questions deal specifically with the 
impact malicious data would have on user of the Ethereal and Snort applications.  Our 
results, shown in Figure 6.2, show that the survey participants believed that both Ethereal 
and Snort were susceptible to denial of information attacks against users of these tools.  
On a Likert scale (1=easy, 6=hard) overwhelming users was an average of 2.18 (n=28, 

















Snort.  While we did not achieve consensus on the reason for a lower average for 
Ethereal, we believe it was likely due to its limited textual display and tree based GUI.  
This assessment is supported by our findings presented in Table 6.2.  In discussions with 
participants following the survey, there was an informal consensus that denial of service 
attacks against the tools would be easier to technically implement, misleading attacks 
would require more subtlety and skill on part of the attacker.  Overwhelming users of 
both Ethereal and Snort was perceived as being noticeably easier than misleading them.  
Snort users were slightly easier to mislead with an average score of 2.63 (n=24, standard 
deviation = 1.527).  Ethereal received an average score of 2.79 (n=28, standard deviation 
= 1.475).  We believe Snort was deemed as more susceptible because of its vulnerability 
to arbitrary alert triggering attacks described in [87]. 
 
Snort and Ethereal Strengths and Weaknesses 
The third section of the survey aimed to clarify why this overload occurred by identifying 
strengths and weaknesses of both Ethereal and Snort.  This section of the survey included 
free form fields that we have summarized in Table 6.2.  Of the 39 survey participants, 32 
included at least one strength or weakness in their response.  The left column of the table 
indicates the strengths and weaknesses and the right column shows the percentage of 
survey participants who included this comment. Ethereal’s primary strengths included the 
ability to analyze protocols and drill down to details of individual packet parameters, but 
was hampered by a overwhelming detail, loss of big picture context and a cumbersome 
user interface.  Snort was highly regarded for its high quality signature database and 




and the complexity of known signatures as well as poor quality front ends.  While these 
are valid concerns and would be a valuable topic for future research, in this paper we will 
focus specifically on addressing the shortcomings of Ethereal’s packet level analysis 
using our visualization tool.  In particular, the following section will evaluate these 
shortcomings using two human-centric experiments.      
     Overall, we were pleased with the results of our survey and believe it helped to answer 
the questions we sought to address.  Participants were largely from our target user 
audience of professional security analysts, which is typically an elusive population to 
gain access to in large numbers. We believe participants were experienced enough to 
effectively answer the questions we posed in the survey.  There was a clear consensus 
that it is easy to insert malicious content into intrusion detection alerts, network packet 
captures and system logs.  Participants believed that it is straightforward to overwhelm 
users of Snort and Ethereal and only slightly more difficult to mislead them.  We helped 
clarify the threshold at which Snort and Ethereal become difficult to use.  While the 
threshold was higher for professional security practitioners than for information security 
students, it was still quite low when considering the ability of attackers to insert 
malicious data into their datasets.  Finally, the survey participants provided a very 
detailed set of strengths and weaknesses for both tools.  Based on these results it is 
clearly possible to overwhelm or mislead users of these two widely deployed tools.  The 
system we designed, RUMINT, was created to address these issues, specifically those of 






Table 6.2: Summary of Ethereal and Snort Strengths and Weaknesses 
Ethereal Strengths  (30 Respondees) Percentage of Responses 
Full view of all packet parameters 27% 
Capture and display filters 27% 
Dissect and analyze protocols 27% 
Ability to sort list elements 7% 
Summary by packet type/packet headers 7% 
Network stream reconstruction 7% 
Ability to use coloring rules to highlight packets 7% 
Ability to view packets in hexadecimal 3% 
Detail oriented search for something specific 3% 
Various modes of capture (live and to disk) 3% 
Interface 3% 
Statistical analysis of data (RTT times) 3% 
Ability to filter network streams 3% 
Ability to alert on known signatures 3% 
Great for beginners 3% 
Great deep packet analysis down to the bit 3% 
Human readable packet contents / ASCII view 3% 
Great for performing spot analysis 3% 
Troubleshooting misconfigured networks 3% 
Open source 3% 
Filtering 3% 
Flexibility 3% 
Ethereal Weaknesses (27 Respondees) Percentage of Responses 
Overwhelming detail / too much for human to process 22% 
Impossible to properly visualize a large dataset without getting lost and confused 11% 
GUI too cumbersome 11% 
Complex filter syntax 7% 
Interface does not scale well 7% 
Loss of context / big picture is hard to see 7% 
Time consuming 7% 
Small/limited data views 7% 
Difficult to find patterns and trends 7% 
Too much information for a list representation 7% 
Not good for constant analysis over a long period of time 4% 
SSL makes much of the payload uninformative 4% 
Not good at network flow analysis 4% 
Inability to disregard non-relevant packets 4% 
Lack of time based histograms for given hosts 4% 
S/N ratio is low in a busy network 4% 
Snort Strengths (18 Respondees) Percentage of Responses 
Robust and configurable filtering 39% 
High quality signature database 28% 
Helps to focus human resources 11% 
Flexibility 11% 
Ability to access details of packets/alerts 11% 
Open source 11% 
Useful as a packet capture program with signature matching capability 6% 
Quick and dirty intrusion detection 6% 
Trend analysis 6% 
De-facto standard 6% 
Automated analysis of data over a long period of time 6% 
Flow based approach 6% 
Cost 6% 
Snort Weaknesses (17 Respondees) Percentage of Responses 
Too many false positives 41% 
Reliance on known signatures 41% 
Time and difficulty in selecting right set of signatures for a given network. 18% 
Front end GUIs are poor 12% 
Tedious analysis 6% 
Dependency on well written rules 6% 
Steep learning curve 6% 
Snort management 6% 
Tuning rules too tightly will cause false negatives 6% 
Lack of good intrusion detection rules 6% 
Backend database slows down with several million entries (MySQL) 6% 





Quantitative Security Evaluation Design and Results 
 
While the survey identified clear problems associated with both Ethereal and Snort, in 
this section we focus specifically on evaluating RUMINT’s effectiveness in addressing 
the key weaknesses of Ethereal:  overwhelming detail, lack of high-level context and a 
cumbersome graphical user interface.  Specifically we sought to determine if human 
analysts can visually detect and precisely locate malicious activity in network packet 
datasets.  We also attempted to determine how long it takes an analyst to perform these 
activities as well as which classes of malicious activity were most easily detectable.  In 
addition, we collected initial statistics which provide insight into how much task specific 
training and analyst experience is required to accomplish these tasks.  Finally, we sought 
to determine how rapidly analyst performance improves during the course of using the 
tool.  In the experiments, tasks were embedded into four questions: packet header 
characterization (Q1) as well as detecting and precisely locating a random data anomaly 
(Q2), fragmentation anomaly (Q3) and 0x90 anomaly (Q4).  
 
Evaluation Design 
With the exception of Question 1, both experiments required participants to perform the 
same tasks.  The first experiment was conducted with 10 students participating in a 
Master of Science in Information Security graduate course.  They completed the entire set 
of tasks in a laboratory running RUMINT, a Windows XP application, inside of a 




Enterprise Linux.  The second experiment was conducted with 22 students in a 4000 level 
course in network security.  Before beginning work on the questions, both groups were 
given a short presentation on security visualization and general use of RUMINT by one 
of the experiment coordinators.  After the presentation, students were given 15 minutes to 
practice with RUMINT using a sample packet capture.  At the end of the hands-on 
practice, participants were given the testing dataset and the question worksheet.  
Participants in the second group completed the hands-on portions of the experiment using 
their own personal computers as a take-home exercise.  Both groups used version 1.94 of 
RUMINT, available here [91], for the evaluation.  Response times were self-reported 
using the operating system’s clock.   Table 6.3 summarizes the characteristics of both 
experiments. 
 
Table 6.3:  Summary of Experiment Construction 





1 MS Infosec 
Students 
10 30 minutes 15 minutes Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4 Conducted in laboratory.   
2 BS EE Students 22 45 minutes 15 minutes Q2, Q3, Q4 Take home 




During the design of our experiments,  we considered a wide variety of metrics to 
evaluate the performance of our system:  task completion, time to completion, error rate, 
satisfaction, training time, learnability, networking and computer security skill level, 
adoption by others, website downloads of RUMINT, frequency and duration of use in 
operational environments, perceived control and perceived ability to complement other 




in order to reasonably scope the experiments.    
 
Tasks  
The tasks we chose were designed to evaluate the performance of RUMINT in the 
execution of a common analytic task:  rapidly gain context on an unfamiliar set of 
network packets and identify and precisely locate suspicious activity for deeper analysis.   
We chose these tasks because lack of context was a key shortcoming identified in our 
survey of analysts.  Ethereal is the tool of choice for packet level analysis, but it quickly 
became overwhelmed with a relatively small number of packets.  These tasks were 
embedded in four questions in the following manner: 
 
Question 1 (Q1):  Header Characterization 
• Characterize 19 header fields into one of four categories:  constant, small 
number, medium number and large number. 
 
Question 2 (Q2):  Random data anomaly 
• identify what packet number the sequence begins and ends 
• identify the number of packets in the sequence 
• identify the destination port 
• characterize the byte composition of the suspicious packets as primarily 






Question 3 (Q3):  Fragmentation anomaly 
• Precisely locate the anomaly by determining the start and end packet 
numbers. 
• Identify the two highest and two lowest values of the fragmentation field 
for this anomaly 
 
Question 4 (Q4):  0x90 Anomalies 
• Precisely locate the anomaly by determining the start and end packet 
numbers for the two groups of packets containing a large number of 0x90 
values. 
 
Table 6.4:  Comparison of Potential Dataset Sources 





DEFCON Capture the Flag 
 
Low Good Yes Multiple teams attack and 
defend networks in an 
isolated environment. 
U.S.  Military  Cyber Defense Exercise Low Good Yes A National Security 
Agency red team attacks 
networks defended by 
students. 
Honeynet  Project  Scan of the Month 
Competition 
Low Good Yes An online competition 
based on live honeynet 
captures.  These datasets 
are well studied and 
analyst solutions are 
available online. 
Georgia Tech Honeynet Low Very Good No Live capture from the 
Georgia Tech Honeynet. 
Georgia Tech Campus Network Very High Excellent No Live capture from the 
Georgia Tech campus 
network. 
Custom Dataset created for experiment Variable Poor Yes Creation of a dataset in a 
laboratory environment. 
User Selected Variable Excellent No Provided by user based on 
real-world requirements.  
Privacy concerns likely. 








To support our experiments, we examined a number of sources of network datasets for 
possible inclusion:  Defcon Capture the Flag [94], United States inter-service academy 
cyber defense (CDX) exercise [116], Honeynet Project Scan of the Month competition 
[56], captures from our university honeynet [83] and real traffic from our university 
campus network.  We also considered creating a custom dataset and allowing individual 
participants to provide their own real-world datasets.  Table 6.4 summarizes each of these 
options.  Ultimately we selected the U.S. military’s CDX dataset because it was publicly 
available and reflected live malicious activity without substantial noise of legitimate 
traffic.  Clearly, coping with varying degrees of legitimate traffic is of concern for 
security visualization systems, but we chose to leave exploration of this topic for future 
work.  We also believe that the Honeynet Scan of the Month competitions are well worth 
evaluating in the future as they contain live traffic capture from the Honeynet Project’s 
network of sensors and are well studied.  Multiple analyses of each dataset are available 
online.  The CDX dataset consists of 919 packets and contains a number of interesting 
anomalies.  These anomalies form the basis of our four questions (Q1-Q4) and allowed us 
to test the experiment participants’ ability to identify and precisely locate them.   
     In conjunction with our human-centric evaluation, we also sought out a dataset that 
was not readily analyzed with automated approaches.  We believe visualization is best 
applied to security problems that cannot readily be addressed using automated solutions.  
Using visualization, humans can inherently detect different patterns and anomalies that 
are difficult or impossible using machine processing.  Machines are best at finding known 
patterns and signatures, but are weak when tasked with detecting abnormalities.  In short, 




of this is the creation of pattern matching rules for signature based intrusion detection 
systems such as Snort.  We ran the CDX dataset through Snort version 2.4.3 using the 
official Sourcefire Vulnerability Research Team rule set version 2.4 released in April 
2005.  Snort detected only an NMAP XMAS scan and generated 87 associated alerts, but 
nothing else.    While we applied the default rule set which most security professionals 
would fine tune to meet their individual needs, Snort’s performance does underscore the 







Figure 6.3:  Visualization of 19 header fields using a parallel coordinate plot. While this 
snapshot shows the header fields from the entire 919 packet dataset, study participants could 


























Rapidly Characterize Packet Header Fields (Q1) 
A key component of gaining context of a new packet capture is acquiring a rapid 
understanding of the packet header fields.  The behavior of header fields gives insight 
into potential malicious behavior.  RUMINT supports visualization of 19 header fields:  
packet length, ethertype, IP version, IP header length, IP differential services, IP total 
length, IP identification, IP flags, IP fragmentation offset, IP time to live (TTL), IP 
transport protocol, IP header checksum, source IP address, destination IP address, TCP 
source port, TCP destination port, TCP sequence number, UDP source port and UDP 
destination port.  Participants were instructed to play back the dataset and observe the 
results using its parallel coordinate plot visualization window. Study participants were 
then asked to rapidly characterize these 19 header fields for all packets in the dataset into 
four categories:  constant, small number of values, medium number of values and large 
number of values.  The training phase of the experiment did not include any specific 
training on this task.  Figure 6.3 shows the visualization window after packets 1-919 were 
played back using the PVR interface.  Students were able to use the interface to begin 
playback at any position in the dataset as well as step through the traffic.  Results from 
this task are shown in Figure 6.4.  The figure depicts correct answers as well as major and 
minor errors.  Minor errors indicate an answer that was one size category away from the 
correct answer, e.g. selecting constant when there were actually a small range of header 
values.  A major error indicates an answer that was two or more categories distant from 
the correct solution. 




accuracy.  The average completion time for this task was 8.03 minutes for the 10 students 
(standard deviation = 3.31).  The overall success rate 86.71%.  The participants 
performed well at identifying large (93.33%) and medium ranges of values (88.75%) as 
well as constants (91.38%), but ran into difficulty when distinguishing between a small 
range of values and constants.  The dataset contained a number of fields that contained 
only two closely placed values.  The label of the second value occluded the label of the 
first value and participants were only 55.00% successful.  While it was still possible to 
observe the difference as the traffic was played back, careful attention was required.  
Overall, we were satisfied with the results of this stage of the experiment and decided to 
omit the question in the second experiment.  We used the additional time to provide extra 
training time for this less experienced group.  Based on post experiment discussions with 
the participants, we project that significant increases in efficiency would be possible on 









Figure 6.5:  Visualization snapshots of the Q2-Q4 anomalies.  Images include the random data anomaly 
(top left), fragmentation anomaly (bottom left) and 0x90 anomaly (bottom right).  The top right image 










Figure 6.6:  Random data anomaly results (Q2):  Study participants were tasked to locate the start 
and stop positions of the anomaly as well as determine the number of packets, destination port and 
bytes missing from each of the packets.  The top chart shows results from the graduate student group.  
With slightly more training time results improved significantly for the undergraduate student group 




Question 2 (Q2):  Random Data Anomaly 
Random data within network traffic can be indicative of covert channels or trojaned 
hosts, but rapidly detecting and analyzing such traffic can be difficult.  To test the 
efficacy of performing this task we asked participants to locate “a sequence of more than 
50 large packets that contain seemingly random data.”  They were told to use the binary 
rainfall and byte frequency visualizations provided by RUMINT.  Both techniques are 
described in Chapter 5.  To summarize, the binary rainfall view plots packet contents, one 
byte per pixel, with one packet per horizontal line.  Pixels are mapped to the bytes 
comprising the packet.   Subsequent packets are plotted on the next lower line.   Large 
packets will consume most of the horizontal line and random payloads will appear as 
white noise.  This region can be seen in the top left image of Figure 6.5.  The byte 
frequency visualization also plots packets one per line, but illuminates pixels based on the 
presence or frequency of a given byte in a packet.  For example, if packet 10 contained 
bytes 20 and 30, pixels (20,10) and (30,10) would be illuminated.  Both visualization 
techniques wrap around to the top of the window when the display is filled.   After 
locating the anomaly, participants were asked to determine the start and end packet 
numbers, the number of packets in the sequence, the destination port and to determine 
which bytes were not used in these packets.   
     The graduate group met with mixed success as they attempted this first anomaly 
detection task with a 55.56% overall success rate (Figure 6.6, top).  Of this group, 
44.44% mistook the 0x90 anomaly (Figure 6.5, bottom right) for the random data 
anomaly (Figure 6.5, top left).  They two anomalies are similar visually, but the 0x90 




experiment, we included a short discussion on the visual characteristics of random data in 
our training session for the undergraduate group using a practice dataset.  As seen in 
Figure 6.6 (bottom), 89.47% of the undergraduate group correctly identified the start and 
stop positions of the anomaly and only 5.26% confused it with the 0x90 anomaly.  Even 
when an anomaly was incorrectly detected, both groups were successful in identifying the 
start and stop position of the anomaly they identified, with a slightly lower performance 
shown by the undergraduate group. Both groups were less successful at identifying the 
destination port in use for the anomaly.  This task required the participants to use both the 
binary rainfall and parallel coordinate plot visualizations to identify the destination port 
in use and we believe this was the cause for the decreased performance.  Similar to the 
port identification task, the participants were also asked to combine the use of the binary 
rainfall visualization and the byte frequency display to identify which bytes were missing 
from the apparently random sequence of data.  Specifically, successful completion of the 
task required the students to mouseover regions of the byte frequency display (Figure 6.5, 
top right).  The graduate group only succeeded 11.11% of the time and no one from the 
undergraduate group was successful, despite increased coverage of the task in the 
undergraduate training session.  Informal discussions with study participants indicated 
the cause to be a lack of a zoom function in the byte frequency visualization and the 
general lack of understanding concerning packet level byte distributions.  We plan to add 








Figure 6.7:  Fragmentation Anomaly Results (Q3):  Study participants were tasked to locate the start and stop 
positions of the fragmentation anomaly and determine the highest and lowest fragmentation field values.  The 




Question 3 (Q3):  Fragmentation Anomaly 
Fragmentation attacks are popular techniques for bypassing intrusion detection systems.  
This question asked participants to find the “significant fragmentation anomaly” within 
the dataset.  They were told to use the parallel coordinate plot display and ensure that one 
of the vertical axes was set for the IP fragmentation field.  No further guidance was 
given.  They were asked to determine the start and end packet number of the anomaly and 
to determine the two highest and two lowest values of the fragmentation field. 
     When analyzing the results from this question, we noted that the performance of the 
graduate group is now on par with the undergraduate group despite the advantage of 
additional training.  The graduate group correctly identified the start and stop positions of 
the anomaly 90 and 80 percent of the time, respectively.  The undergraduate group 
succeeded at 89.47% and 84.27% for the same tasks.  We attribute this increase to the 
deeper level of expertise of the graduate students combined with the hands on experience 
garnered during questions Q1 and Q2.  Likewise, both groups improved their use of the 
binary rainfall visualization in conjunction with the parallel coordinate plot and succeed 








Figure 6.8:  0x90 Anomaly Results (Q4):  Study participants were tasked to locate the start and stop positions 
of the two anomalies consisting of packets containing a large number of 0x90 values. The top chart shows 




Question 4 (Q4):  Two 0x90 Anomalies 
Buffer overflows are a major problem in today’s network security environment.  Many 
implementations of this attack use a no operation (NOP) sled to allow the attacker a 
larger target to direct code execution.  Traditional buffer overflow attacks use a series of 
0x90 values as a NOP sled because 0x90 equates to the no operation instruction on Intel  
CPU’s.   Because of this use, we included a button on the binary rainfall display that 
users display all packet contents of value 0x90 in bright red.  More recent variations of 
the buffer overflow use sequences of idempotent instructions that are equivalent to NOPs 
in order to hide their presence.  We plan to explore these more advanced obfuscation 
techniques in the future, but 0x90 NOP sleds are still in use and we believe this is a 
valuable first step in the human detection of buffer overflows.  Participants were 
instructed to find the two 0x90 anomalies (shown in red in the bottom right image of 
Figure 6.5) within the dataset and record their start and end packet numbers. 
     The results from question 4 show a similar increase on those from question 3.  Both 
groups succeeded at the 0x90 detection task approximately 95% of the time with nearly 
identical results between the two groups.   Similar to the increase in successful task 
completion with each subsequent anomaly detection task, there was a distinct decrease in 
task completion time (Figure 6.9).  It took the graduate group, on average, 16.22 minutes 
(standard deviation = 6.22), 5.16 minutes (standard deviation = 1.53) and 2.90 (standard 
deviation = 1.45)  minutes to complete tasks Q2-Q4 respectively.  While each question 
contained a varying number of tasks and therefore cannot say conclusively, we believe 
that this significant decrease in task completion time was based on increasing familiarity 






     After the quantitative portions of the evaluation, we asked participants to estimate the 
point at which overload occurs using RUMINT.  As none of the study participants 
completed our survey reported in the previous section, we also asked them to evaluate the 
overload point of Ethereal.  We combined these new Ethereal responses with the student 
responses from our initial survey and plotted them in conjunction with RUMINT 
responses on Figure 6.10.    The combined student groups yielded a total of 29 Ethereal 
and 15 RUMINT responses with average overload occurring at 907.79 packets (standard 
deviation = 1,806.80) for Ethereal and 9,056 packets (standard deviation 13,434.96) for 
RUMINT.   Based on this qualitative assessment we achieved about an order of 
magnitude better performance than Ethereal. 
 
 
Figure 6.9:  Task Completion Time Results.  Both groups experienced significant decreases in task 








     In summary, we believe RUMINT was successful in reducing denial of information 
problems for security analysts.  Humans were able to detect malicious activity in the 
playback of forensic network traffic.   The malicious activity we tested in questions 2-4 
were large visual anomalies within the dataset and therefore, the full extent of visual 
anomaly detection for security visualization still remains a ripe area for future work.  
When anomalies were detected, participants were able to precisely locate the packets of 
interest due to the strength of the PVR interface metaphor.  We believe this capability is 
critical to facilitate additional follow-on analysis with a tool such as Ethereal.  While the 
 
 
Figure 6.10:  Comparison of overload point of Ethereal and RUMINT based on a percentage of 
responses.  RUMINT demonstrated approximately an order of magnitude better performance when 




PVR interface was successful, the addition of packet identification capabilities to the 
individual visualization windows, e.g. pop up windows generated by placing the mouse 
pointer over a packet, would be a useful addition.  Our results indicate that only limited 
training on security visualization and use of the tool was required for effective use by 
individuals knowledgeable in network security.  In our experiments, participants were 
given 30-45 minutes of overview training and were allowed 15 minutes for hands on 
practice.  Despite the short training period, they rapidly grasped the usage and application 
of RUMINT.  In addition, task completion time dropped dramatically during the 
evaluation session from 16 minutes on Q1 to 5 minutes on Q2 and 3 minutes on Q3 
further supporting our assessment.   We feel that the basic visual security analysis 
approach of RUMINT is sound, but would be enhanced by future work in several areas:  
the creation of a library of visual snapshots of legitimate and malicious activity, adding 
the ability to easily zoom into the visualization windows and by increasing filtering and 
color coding capabilities.  We believe our general evaluation methodology approach was 
sound, but would like to further evaluate the tool with professional security analysts in 
their normal work environment.  Study materials from the survey and experiments, as 









CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
Denial of information is a problem that we face in a wide variety of areas.  In particular, 
the adversarial nature of the computer security domain illustrates the constant tension 
between malicious entities and the operators charged with defending an organization’s 
information resources.  While there are many possible solutions, we have explored the 
use of carefully crafted information visualizations to cope with the massive, and possibly 
tainted, amount of security data generated by network sensors and host-based 
applications.  Previous techniques such as manually traversing textual logs, using 
command line analysis scripts and traditional graphing and charting techniques provide 
only a limited defense against overwhelming or misleading human defenders.  With these 
existing tools it is difficult to gain a coherent picture of network health and security 
status.  In many instances, this flood of data will actually reduce the overall level of 
security by consuming the operator’s available time or misdirecting their efforts.  In 
extreme circumstances, the operators will become desensitized and ignore security 
warnings altogether, effectively negating the value of their security systems.  Information 
visualization of security related data bears great promise in countering these problems 
and, ultimately, will assist in making our personal computers, servers and networks more 
secure.  Such work is both an art and a science requiring expertise from the computer 
graphics, information visualization, interface design and security communities in order to 
turn the raw security data into insightful and actionable information and knowledge.  
 154 
With the problem of denial of information there is no shortage of raw data, in fact there is 
far more than can be analyzed without employing more advanced techniques.   
     Information Visualization is one way of effectively communicating information.  
Deception is one way to negatively affect this capability.  Today’s systems are being used 
in critical applications to glean insights that are difficult to see using traditional non-
visual techniques.  As malicious entities become aware of the power of these tools, the 
tools themselves and the decision makers that use them will increasingly become the 
subject of attack.  These vulnerabilities may manifest as significant attacks and we have 
provided real world examples to show that these attacks are real.  Any system that uses 
data from malicious trusted or untrusted sources is at risk.  Today’s visualization 
technology has not been designed with consideration of these risks and the notion of 
active malicious entities.  Even carefully user-customized applications are vulnerable due 
to incorrect defaults, limitations in the visualizations themselves and weaknesses in the 
overall system.  To better defend information visualization systems against denial of 
information attack we have presented a framework and taxonomy for analysis, presented 
viable attacks from the network security domain as well as developed design principles 
and assumptions to help create systems that protect both the system and the user.    We 
used these principles to design an attack resistant tool, RUMINT, that is capable of both 
real-time and forensic analysis of packet-level data. The system is capable of replaying 
large capture files and providing much needed insight and big picture context.  
     The system has proven to be a useful tool for multiple purposes. We effectively used it 
in a wide variety of instances to get a rapid overview of datasets. This was a crucial 
aspect when analyzing our three-year honeynet capture archive of approximately 100 GB. 
 155 
Especially for these forensic analysis tasks, we found a significant decrease in the time 
required to find points of interest in the capture files. 
     RUMINT can give a much faster high-level impression about traffic patterns and 
events than an analysis with Ethereal or similar programs. Once areas of interest have 
been identified in the data using our visualization tool, Ethereal can then be used to do a 
deep-protocol analysis. We believe that incorporating similar protocol analysis directly 
into our tool is both technically feasible and a logical direction for the future. 
     As part of the design and testing of RUMINT we explored the combination of 
dynamic queries, semantic zooming and interactive encoding with a visualization 
technique for comparing large numbers of binary objects.  We then used the system to 
study several datasets containing large numbers of malicious and non-malicious network 
packets.  We believe the binary rainfall visualization technique is useful for off-line 
forensic analysis of network datasets and, to a lesser degree, for real time network 
monitoring and intrusion detection.  In both applications it should be augmented with 
dynamic queries, semantic zooming and interactive filtering to eliminate noise and 
highlight areas of interest.  We also believe that these techniques would work extremely 
well for navigation within and analysis of binary files, particularly when combined with 
semantic encoding and transforms based on knowledge of the file type. 
     Our fingerprinting results demonstrated that common protocols as well as popular 
attack tools of the network reconnaissance and vulnerability assessment classes can be 
readily detected by passive promiscuous mode sniffing and appropriate visualizations.  
While some occlusion occurs, fingerprints are frequently visible despite the visual noise 
of routine traffic.  For future work we envision fingerprinting worm behavior and other 
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well-known malicious network activity (e.g. spyware, trojans and warez servers), dual-
use activities (e.g. FTP servers, Internet Relay Chat servers) as well as typically 
legitimate network activities (e.g. email, web browsing).  Our long-term goal is to create 
a library of visual signatures that can be used by the expert or novice analysts to detect 
malicious activity.  Ultimately, we believe that visual intrusion detection systems can 
effectively supplement traditional signature and anomaly based intrusion detection 
systems, but care must be taken avoid overwhelming the human operator.  To this end, 
the effectiveness of any tool is defined by its usability.  Careful task-driven usability 
studies that optimize ease of use and analyst intuition, will make visual intrusion 
detection systems more successful and drive down the skill barrier required for effective 
use. 
     We believe our evaluation of RUMINT was successful, in that we gained significant 
insight into its ability to counter denial of information attacks.  Our survey confirmed our 
intuition that many sources of security data are susceptible to corruption by attackers, that 
the overload point at which human users of two extremely popular analysis tools, 
Ethereal and Snort, is relatively low and that these tools are vulnerable to attacks which 
attempt to mislead or confuse the user.  The survey also provided a large number of 
strengths and weaknesses that are useful to design better tools.  By designing RUMINT 
to complement the weaknesses of Ethereal we then focused on evaluating several tasks 
that examined the analyst’s ability to visually detect and precisely locate anomalies 
within unfamiliar network packet captures.  In general, our study participants were 
successful and their informal feedback was largely positive, particularly with regard to 
the potential of visual approaches to the analysis of security data.  Our experiments 
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provided lessons learned that we believe will be useful by other researchers attempting to 
evaluate their security tools as well as quantitative results that demonstrated a rapid 
increase in performance with a small increase in training time and hands on use of the 
tool.  Additionally, our results indicate that information security students using Ethereal 
reach overload at approximately 908 packets and users of RUMINT overload at 9,057.  
Our tool does not match the deep protocol analysis capabilities of Ethereal, but we do 
believe that it provides about an order of magnitude better performance when attempting 
to gain context of network packet captures.   For future work we plan to incorporate 
feedback into the design of RUMINT by adding the ability to combine multiple security 
related data sources into a combined display as well as improve the RUMINT’s 
interactive filtering and reporting capabilities.  We also plan to continue to engage the 
professional computer security community to gather requirements for our future systems 
as we believe this step is critical to produce relevant work.  Finally, we plan to further 
quantify the threshold at which overload occurs, particularly as malicious data is 
introduced into the datasets under analysis.   
      There are many ripe areas for future work in the area of denial of information and 
security visualization.  When trying to determine these areas it is useful to reexamine the 
framework for security visualization systems presented in Figure 5.1.  For example, each 
visualization system is only as good as the data upon which it relies.  Today’s systems 
utilize only one or two security data flows, but there lies great potential in the combined 
use of many of the possible data streams from existing security solutions.  Examples 
include:  packet captures, intrusion detection/prevention system logs, syslog, firewall 
logs, anti-virus reports, netflows captures, routing data, client/server process listings, 
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honeynet logs and data generated by other network appliances.  Allowing the user to 
interact with as many possible security data streams as possible is a sound beginning, but 
will likely result in too much information without advances in filtering techniques.  As a 
starting point, Ethereal’s comprehensive command line filtering language is a good 
example to emulate and can be extended to all possible data streams, but it should be 
complemented with carefully designed graphical user interface components.  These 
interfaces components will allow the user to manage the complexity of multiple data 
streams and could be used in parallel with command line filters to create a library of 
sharable analyst knowledge akin to what is embedded in Snort’s well established set of 
signatures.  Such a library would permit users to examine and quickly remove legitimate 
traffic and known slices of malicious activity and thereby allow them to focus on the 
more interesting remainder. The semantic knowledge required to filter traffic may also 
prove very useful to highlight activity of interest.  In some instances, the user may wish 
to use this same library to encode their visualizations with the additional semantic 
information (e.g. highlight patterns matching the most recent virus outbreak) instead of 
immediately filtering.  As the remaining data flows from the filtering stage it passes to 
the graphics engine and is subsequently displayed.  Matching these data flows with 
efficient and effective visualizations has been partially explored, but with a near infinite 
range of potential visualizations and interaction techniques, there remain many areas of 
future work.  A good starting point is to explore existing information visualization 
techniques from other domains and applying them to security problems.   When such 
systems are built, they must be validated with more precise techniques than just anecdotal 
evidence and intuition.  The quantitative evaluation presented in this dissertation is an 
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initial investigation into this area, but future systems should extend this work by formally 
exploring system effectiveness with candidate users.  Likewise, visualization is a 
computationally intensive task.  Hardware performance has only been explored at the 
most fundamental level.  Further work is needed to determine the strengths and 
limitations of both the visualization hardware and the human using it.  Finally, 
visualization provides a new means for creating both logs and reports that are more 
effective at communicating results to analysts, managers, end-users and customers. Little 
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